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HOMELESSNESS: A LEGAL ACTIVIST ANALYSIS
OF JUDICIAL AND STREET STRATEGIES*
DAVID WOODWARD, ESQ.**
INTRODUCTION
In the living room of the headquarters of the Community
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), an advocacy group for
homeless people in Washington, D.C., sits an old white piano.
Atop the piano are six rectangular Lucite boxes. What is inside
these boxes is not pleasant: "Each contains the ashes of a street
person who froze to death."1
This article is for the Lucite 6, for the homeless, for their
advocates. Its aim is to contribute to the discussion of strategies,
both judicial and non-judicial, that might be pursued to keep
the line of Lucite boxes from extending further.
The article has four parts. Part I develops a total depriva-
tion litigative theory, a theory supportive of judicial recognition
and protection of not only a right to shelter for the homeless but
a broad range of the basic human needs, such as subsistence in-
come, food, education, and health care. Where absolute depriva-
* This article, written for homeless people and their advocates, explores various
judicial and street strategies for combating the nationwide problem of homelessness.
Part I develops a total deprivation litigation theory applicable to potential judicial
recognition not only of a right to shelter for the homeless, but of other basic human
needs as well (for example, subsistence income, food, education, and health care). Part II
looks at indirect judicial approaches toward a right to shelter, including those based on
state welfare, mental health and sex discrimination law grounds. Part III examines non-
judicial, street strategies for combating the street problem of homelessness. Part IV
urges that principles of legal activism, from "legal leverage" to "guerilla law," should
inform the process of selecting the most effective strategies, both judicial and extra-
judicial, to be used in the search for shelter for the homeless in any community.
** Mr. Woodward is presently on leave from Legal Services, Inc. in Chambersburg,
Pa. to attend George Washington University's Law Center, where he is studying for a
Master of Laws with an emphasis in public interest law. Mr. Woodward has been the
housing law specialist at Legal Services, Inc. since 1976, and is a member of Pennsylva-
nia Rural Housing Coalition, the Housing Law Specialist Task Force of the Pennsylvania
Legal Services Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union.
1. Boodman, CCNV Members Go to Market; Donations and Dumpsters Serve As
Sources of Food, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1984, at A19, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Boodman].
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tion or total denial of a protected right or of a life essential, such
as shelter, can be established, it may still be possible, even
under the present Supreme Court's rules of the game, to sound
affirmative constitutional overtones on behalf of homeless people
specifically and the poor generally.
Part I exposes the weaknesses as well as the strengths of
total deprivation analysis. Although an absolute deprivation ar-
gument may be one of the few remaining working levers to move
modern courts toward constitutional protection of shelter and
other economic rights, it is hardly enough. Much more is needed
than a litigative theory that, while workable within its intended
scope, invites misapplication by suggesting that constitutional
protection of subsistence interests is to be triggered only upon a
showing of complete denial.
Part II begins the search for that something more. It looks
at indirect judicial avenues that might lead to some solutions to
the homelessness puzzle. These "side door" approaches include
the use of welfare law provisions, mental health law concepts,
and sex discrimination principles to combat homelessness. Penn-
sylvania law is used as a focal point in Part II for illustrative
purposes, primarily because it is the state law with which I am
most familiar. However, the principles and strategies discussed
are peculiar to no state but share mental health, welfare and sex
discrimination statutory ground common to many states.
Part III looks at non-judicial, street strategies. It recognizes
that the solutions, like the problem itself, may well be in the
streets and the community. As Professor Sparer reminded us
shortly before his death, legal rights, while necessary, are not
alone sufficient.2 Recognition by the judiciary of basic human
rights, such as a right to shelter for homeless people, must be
tied to social movement and vice versa.' Theater or media tac-
tics are examined: from CCNV's erection of a tent city across
from the White House, to its release of 100 cockroaches from a
Washington, D.C. shelter in the State Department's dining room
and its banquet for Congressmen of crabmeat and quiche
2. Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Strug-
gle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509
(1984).
3. For a similar orientation, see Law, Economic Justice in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS
134 (N. Dorsen ed., 1st ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Law, Economic Justice].
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scrounged from area trash cans.' Beyond its analysis of often es-
sentially theatrical ploys, Part III focuses on such nonjudicial al-
ternatives as use of the ballot initiative and other legislative and
administrative advocacy, coalition building and church
involvement.
Running throughout this article is a common yardstick used
to measure the relative merits of each of the strategies discussed
in Parts I-III. That yardstick is built from principles of legal ac-
tivism, particularly the concepts of legal leverage, legal judo,
guerilla law, the likelihood of success, indirection, public interest
and considerations of the ancillary advantages of legal action.5
The meaning of these legal activism guides and their application
to the strategies reviewed in Parts I-III are the focus of Part IV.
Before scrutinizing strategies, judicial and extra-judicial, for
alleviating homelessness, it helps to begin at the judicial sys-
tem's present starting point, the boundaries the present Su-
preme Court has set.
I. SUPREME COURT PARAMETERS
A. Hands Off "Economic and Social Welfare" Laws
Even within the hands-off approach the Supreme Court has
taken to "economic and social welfare" law, it remains possible
to extract a good but imperfect litigative model. A total depriva-
tion analysis holds promise for extending judicial recognition of
a right to shelter for the homeless, as well as protection of other
basic subsistence interests.
The Supreme Court's approaches to economic rights is not
an inviting one for the homeless and their advocates. Justice
Brennan offers a succinct summary of the place poverty law and
subsistence rights hold within the present Court's hierarchy of
values: "[T]he mode of analysis employed by the Court. . .vir-
tually immunizes social and economic legislative classifications
4. See infra notes 212-32 and accompanying text.
5. These legal activism precepts are outlined by Professor John Banzhaf in his Legal
Activism course at George Washington University's National Law Center (Winter 1984).
6. Part I of this article originally appeared in Woodward, Affirmative Constitutional
Overtones: Do Any Still Sound for the Person?, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 268-98
(1985), and is republished here with the kind permission of the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press.
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from judicial review."'7 The opening chord of this analysis was
struck in Dandridge v. Williams:8
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not of-
fend the Constitution simply because the classification
"is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality." [Citation omitted.]
"A statutory classification will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
[Citation omitted]. e
What began as a chord has become a repeated refrain. Dan-
dridge's language, and its standard of judicial non-review of
statutes have been invoked to uphold wide disparities in the
treatment of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
recipients (grants equaling 50% of need) as compared to recipi-
ents of assistance for the elderly (100% of need) and the blind
(95% of need);10 to sustain a gross differential in educational
funding between property poor school districts ($356 per child)
and property rich districts ($594 per child);" to justify termina-
tion of essential social security disability benefits without first
affording the recipient a hearing; 2 to validate the denial of Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) benefits of $25 per month to
mentally ill indigents who live in public mental institutions; s to
sanction elimination of "windfall" retirement benefits to certain
classes of retired railroad workers;' to reject challenges to state
work rules that disqualify from public assistance persons who
left their job within 75 days of applying for assistance, 5 and
that condition eligibility for assistance on compliance with state
7. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
8. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
9. Id. at 485.
10. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 537 n.3 (1972).
11. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973).
12. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
14. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
15. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976).
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imposed requirements applicable to those presumed to be em-
ployable;' 6 and to validate a nine month duration-of-relationship
test that operates to deny widows' and children's social security
benefits to those unable to establish that their relationship to
the deceased wage earner began at least nine months prior to
the deceased's death.17
The list goes on but the point is clear. The minimum ration-
ality straitjacket woven by the Supreme Court is a powerful con-
straint. Are there ways to loosen the strings?
B. The Total Deprivation Theory
A total deprivation model can be constructed from the
Court's own building blocks of constitutional law precedent. As
both commentators' 8 and the Court's have noted, equal protec-
tion and due process raise different core questions. Equal pro-
tection asks "the distributive question" of whether the particu-
lar plaintiff and the group of which he is a member are excluded
from some benefit because of poverty. Due process, on the other
hand, focuses more on the individual plaintiff, avoids the wealth
question, and asks where these particular facts fit within "the
federal constitutional definition of the essentials of ordered
liberty." 20
A cross-cutting theory is needed, one that would address in-
dividual and group claims of exclusion under either or both
traditional equal protection and due process analyses. The ele-
mental question such a theory would ask is this: is the depriva-
tion suffered by the individual or group total?"1 If it is, and the
16. New York State Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
17. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
18. Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 329-30 [hereinafter cited as Clune].
19. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
20. Clune, supra note 18, at 299.
21. Professor Gary Simpson has advocated a somewhat similar, but more complex
analysis, one element of which inquires into whether the disadvantage suffered is total,
significant, or insignificant. The other pertinent questions a court should ask under the
Simpson model are (1) whether the interest at stake is fundamental, significant or in-
sigificant; (2) whether the government interest behind the classification between means
and ends is necessary, significant, insignificant, or unlawful; and (3) whether the relation-
ship between means and ends is necessary, significant, insignificant, or nonexistent.
Simpson A Method For Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under The Equal Protection
Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 678-80 (1977). With these multiple factors Professor Simp-
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absolute deprivation is of a life essential interest, then the gov-
ernment's reasons for the complete exclusion must be very good
indeed.
This formulation may sound distinctively off key to anyone
who has listened to what the present Supreme Court has been
saying about poverty related issues. But careful listening reveals
that the total deprivation theme has been sounded even by the
Burger Court.
1. The Rodriguez Dicta and Plyler v. Doe
Modern education law cases, San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez22 and Plyler v. Doe,2 8 suggest that claims of total dep-
rivation or complete exclusion may still be persuasive. Rodriguez
is usually read negatively by poor people's advocates. Indeed, its
message to the poor is essentially negative. In its explicit rejec-
tion of the claims that education is a fundamental right and that
wealth discrimination is inherently suspect,"4 Rodriguez reveals
a Court leaning heavily against the door opened by its
predecessor.
Yet Rodriguez, easily read as an end point to arguments
that poverty and education implicate fundamental rights, can
also be read as a beginning point for total exclusion analysis.
Rodriguez leaves open the question whether minimum access to
education may, under the right facts, be constitutionally
compelled:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum
of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite
to the meaningful exercise of either right [speech or vot-
ing], we have no indication that the present levels of edu-
cational expenditures in Texas provide an education that
falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might
son constructs an elaborate matrix and suggests that many of the Supreme Court's pov-
erty law cases, including Dandridge, Jefferson, and Valtierra, might well have been de-
cided as they were even under his proposed model. The strength of Professor Simpson's
model lies in the attention it brings to the "magnitude of the deprivation" factor. Its
weakness, however, may be in not placing enough emphasis on that factor, and thereby
sanctioning many of the Supreme Court's more insensitive poverty law cases.
22. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
24. 411 U.S. at 18-2S.
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have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute
denial of educational opportunities to any of its chil-
dren, that argument provides no basis for finding an in-
terference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved and where-as
is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be
made that the system fails to provide each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills neces-
sary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.5
The right facts were not too long in coming. In Plyler v.
Doe,2 6 the Court held that a state's total exclusion of undocu-
mented alien pupils from its school system did not further any
substantial state interest and therefore denied equal protec-
tion.2 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, gave three rea-
sons for applying the "intermediate scrutiny" standard of equal
protection review. First, the Texas statutory scheme discrimi-
nated against children based upon the conduct of their parents
(unlawful entry into the United States) over which they had no
control. Second, nodding to Rodriguez ("Public education is
not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution"), 9 the
Court nevertheless said that education plays "a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society. ' 30 Justice Brennan
stressed that "[w]e cannot ignore the significant social costs
borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.""
Third, "denial of education to some isolated group of children
poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection
Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unrea-
sonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual
merit. '3 2 The denial, the Court made clear, is total and
permanent:
25. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
26. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id. at 220.
29. Id. at 221.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 221-22.
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Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read
and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic
education each and every day of his life. The inestimable
toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellec-
tual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and
the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it
most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a
status-based denial of basic education with the frame-
work of equality embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause.83
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion underlines the total
deprivation theme struck by Justice Brennan. Arguing that "the
Rodriguez formulation does not settle every issue of 'fundamen-
tal rights' arising under the Equal Protection Clause, ' 4 Justice
Blackmun analogized the complete denial of an education to the
denial of the right to vote:
Children denied an education are placed at a permanent
and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an un-
educated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.
And when those children are members of an identifiable
group, that group-through the State's action-will have
been converted into a discrete underclass . ...
[C]lassifications involving the complete denial of educa-
tion are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of
equal protection values by involving the State in the cre-
ation of permanent class distinctions. [Citation omitted].
In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of
denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the indi-
vidual to second class social status; the latter places him
at a permanent political disadvantage.3 5
The potential scope of Plyler is broad. The Court's sensitiv-
ity to the reach of its opinion is reflected indirectly in Justice
Powell's concurring opinion and directly in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent. Justice Powell cautiously emphasized "the unique
33. Id. at 222.
34. Id. at 232-33. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 234.
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character of the cases before us." 36 Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, predicted that
"the Court's opinion rests on such a unique confluence of theo-
ries and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the
results of these particular cases.'3
Unquestionably there are special factors present in Plyler
that are potentially limiting. The case, after all, involved chil-
dren as innocent victims of actions taken by their parents which
the children were virtually powerless to control. The interest in
some minimal level of education was also at stake. Unable to
escape the Rodriguez conclusion that education is not a funda-
mental right meriting strict scrutiny, Justice Brennan was at
least able to invoke heightened scrutiny by stressing the unques-
tioned "importance of education in maintaining our basic insti-
tutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of
the child."" Finally, forming a significant part of the backdrop
of Plyler is immigration law, an area in which both the constitu-
tion and the courts have afforded plenary power to Congress to
develop "a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation
and status within our borders."3 The Court rejected the argu-
ment that the traditional deference to Congressional judgments
in immigration matters shields Texas' exclusion of undocu-
mented alien children from its schools.40 However, the signifi-
cance of the undocumented alien status issue is reflected in both
Justice Brennan's argument that these children are visited with
a complete deprivation for reasons wholly beyond their control,4 '
and in Justice Powell's parallel contentions that these children
"have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by
their parents," that they "have been singled out for a lifelong
penalty and stigma," and that "[a] legislative classification that
threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and
residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment. '42
36. Id. at 236. (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 243. (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 221.
39. Id. at 225.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
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2. Poverty Law Precedent Revisited
The total deprivation idea, however, cannot be so easily
contained within the special facts of Plyler. The principle is not
unique to Plyler. Indeed, when the absolute deprivation lens is
used to examine the watershed poverty law cases of both the
Burger and Warren Courts, the view proves to be remarkably
clear and revealing. In cases in which the deprivation is per-
ceived by the Court to be absolute, the litigants challenging the
total exclusion have won. In cases in which the loss is viewed as
partial, or the realization of the interest at stake is seen as being
merely delayed and not completely foreclosed, the challengers
have generally lost. The total deprivation principle implicit in
Rodriguez and Plyler permeates both the Warren and Burger
Courts' poverty law precedent in a wide range of areas, including
criminal justice, voting, residency, access to courts and public
benefits cases.
a. Criminal Justice
The formative poverty law cases involving claims by indi-
gent defendants to access to the state criminal appellate system
sketch the beginning outlines of this pattern. Underlying the
Court's famous holding in Griffin v. IUinois'3 -that a state's de-
nial of full appellate review of a criminal conviction solely on
grounds of the defendant's inability to pay for a transcript of
the trial violates due process and equal protection""-is the sug-
gestion that such a denial is the equivalent of a complete depri-
vation of the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Jus-
tice Douglas' majority opinion equates the denial of a trial
transcript to indigent defendants with a law that would bar such
defendants from pleading not guilty or defending if they were
unable to prepay court costs.40 Such a legal system would make
the fair trial guarantee a mockery, "a worthless thing.'' 46 Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Griffin draws a similar par-
allel. Illinois' decision to allow appellate review of constitutional
claims, but foreclose review of trial errors (such as rulings on
43. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id.
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admissibility of evidence) in the absence of a transcript, is the
same, Justice Frankfurter insisted, as requiring a $500 fee as a
prerequisite to an appeal.47 The effect is identical-shutting off
the "means of appellate review for indigent defendants.'4 Like
Griffin, Douglas v. California,'9 which established an indigent
defendant's right to court appointed counsel on appeal, 50 can be
read as a reflection of the Court's recognition that appellate re-
view without the assistance of counsel is really no appellate re-
view at all.
The post-Griffin-Douglas criminal fees cases pick up the
deprivation theme but begin to use it as a limiting principle.
Even Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Britt v. North
Carolina,51 could find no equal protection violation in the state's
failure to provide on appeal a free transcript of an indigent de-
fendant's initial trial that ended in a mistrial.2 The deprivation
was not total. An alternative to a transcript existed. The trial
took place in a small town in which the court reporter was on
friendly terms with local attorneys and would have read back
the trial record to counsel had he made the request.53 While the
Britt dissent raises legitimate questions about the validity of the
Court's conclusion that such an informal local practice is an ef-
fective alternative to a full written transcript,' the Court's focus
on the availability of alternatives as an escape from the reach of
Griffin is revealing.
Douglas was similarly limited in Ross v. Moffitt,5 which
held that neither equal protection nor due process mandates
that a state provide counsel to an indigent defendant seeking
discretionary review from the state's supreme court or the
United States Supreme Court, at least where counsel has been
appointed for the indigent's first appeal as of right at the inter-
mediate state appellate court level.56 Justice Rehnquist's ration-
47. Id. at 22. (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
48. Id. at 23.
49. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
50. Id. at 357-58.
51. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
52. Id. at 227-30.
53. Id. at 229.
54. Id. at 234-43, (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
56. Id. at 616-18.
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ale for not extending the Douglas principle beyond the first level
of appellate review fits snugly within the total deprivation
model. The indigent defendant seeking further review is not de-
nied access to the criminal appellate system, Justice Rehnquist
tells us, because he already had counsel at the first step of ap-
pellate review in state court, a full transcript of the trial pro-
ceedings was available at the first step, and counsel's brief and
an opinion by the intermediate state appellate court were gener-
ated at that level.57 Nothing further is required for additional
appellate review. To Justice Rehnquist and the Ross majority,
this is therefore a different case from the earlier fee cases where
state procedures operated to cut off any appeal at all for an indi-
gent unable to pay the required transcript fee.58
Ross makes very clear that the Court's view of the early fee
cases is a narrow one. They mean not what they say but what
they were meant to say, merely that a state cannot arbitrarily
deny all appeal rights to indigents while affording affluent de-
fendants avenues for appeal.
Further evidence of the importance of the total deprivation
factor in criminal cases is offered by Williams v. Illinois.59 Illi-
nois kept an indigent man in jail beyond the maximum statutory
term simply because of his inability to pay $5 court costs and a
$500 fine.60 The total deprivation of the defendant's liberty in-
terest based on poverty alone was unmistakable and could not
be squared with equal protection. 1
b. Voting
The Court has shown us the positive and negative sides of
the deprivation coin in contexts outside of the criminal justice
system. Its poverty related voting cases are prime exhibits. Vir-
ginia's poll tax of $1.50 was struck down in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections" because, as a prerequisite to voting in Vir-
ginia elections, it totally disenfranchised destitute citizens. 8
57. Id. at 614-15.
58. Id. at 612.
59. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
60. Id. at 236-37.
61. Id. at 240-42.
62. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
63. Id. at 668.
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Similarly, in Bullock v. Carter"4 the Court invalidated a Texas
filing fee requirement for primary elections because it effectively
barred all potential candidates unable to pay the fee." And in
Kramer v. Union Free School District," a New York statute,
limiting eligibility to voting in school district elections to prop-
erty owners, tenants and parents with children attending school
in the district, was held to violate equal protection because it
was not narrowly tailored and involved "an absolute denial of
the franchise. ' '67
Where the denial of the right to vote is not absolute, very
different consequences follow. For example, an Illinois statute
making absentee ballots available to certain persons, including
those absent from the country for any reason and those physi-
cally disabled and therefore unable to come to the polls, was up-
held against a challenge by prisoners awaiting trial who argued
that the absence of a similar statutory provision for them vio-
lated equal protection." The Court was unconvinced. It could
find no evidence that the state had "precluded appellants from
voting."' Illinois may have made available alternative means of
voting, such as installing special voting booths at the jail, pro-
viding guarded transportation of pretrial detainees to the polls,
or granting temporary bail reductions to those defendants wish-
ing to vote. 0 In other words, at least as the Court read it, there
was "nothing in the record to show that appellants are in fact
absolutely prohibited from voting by the State."7 This, the
Court later explained in Kramer,2 marks the difference. Illinois
in McDonald had simply made voting easier for some people
who were unable to go to the polls; "there was no evidence that
the statute absolutely prohibited anyone from exercising the
franchise. ' 73 On the other hand, New York in Kramer did to-
tally deny the right to vote itself to anyone outside the statuto-
64. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
65. Id. at 144-49.
66. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
67. Id. at 626 n.6.
68. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802, at 803-4 (1969).
69. Id. at 808.
70. Id. at 808 n.6.
71. Id. at 808 n.7.
72. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
73. Id. at 627 n.6.
19861
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
rily favored classes of eligible voters."'
c. Residency
The Court's residency cases with poverty law ties exhibit a
deprivation pattern quite similar to the voting cases. The needy
plaintiffs in Shapiro v. Thompson7 5 were precluded from receiv-
ing any AFDC benefits during their first year of residency.76 In-
digent newcomers to Arizona who needed medical treatment
faced a comparable bar in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County.77 There the Court invalidated, under equal protection, a
state statute requiring an indigent to be a resident of the county
for the previous twelve months in order to qualify for nonemer-
gency medical care. 6 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas
drew attention to the height of the statutory barrier. He argued
that unlike Rodriguez, where at least theoretically "there was no
legal barrier to movement to a better [property rich] district,
[hiere a one-year barrier to medical care . . . is erected around
areas that have medical facilities for the poor."'79 As in Shapiro,
the fence keeping out the poor was insurmountable, the depriva-
tion complete.
On the other hand, where the one year residency require-
ment at issue is viewed as merely delaying realization of rights
or satisfaction of needs deemed less important than, say, voting
or medical assistance, the absence of the total deprivation factor
is telling. Thus in Sosna v. Iowa,80 a state's one year residency
requirement for divorces was upheld. 1 Justice Rehnquist distin-
guished Shapiro and Maricopa, as well as Dunn v. Blumen-
stein,82 on grounds that "Sosna's claim is not total deprivation
74. Id. at 630.
75. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
76. Id. at 627.
77. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
78. Id. at 253-70.
79. Id. at 271 (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
81. Id. at 404-10.
82. 405 U.S. 330 (1972), holding Tennessee's one year durational residency require-
ment for voting in state elections, and its comparable three month residency rule for
county elections, to be unnecessary to the furtherance of any compelling government
interest and therefore violative of equal protection. Justice Marshall's majority opinion
in Dunn is couched in the language of total deprivation. It underscores that Tennessee's
law divides residents into old and new and discriminates against the latter "to the extent
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* . .but only delay."8 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that unlike
those cases, and Boddie v. Connecticut,84 the plaintiff in Sosna
''was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of
what she sought." ' Nor, one would argue, were the plaintiffs in
Shapiro, Maricopa, and Dunn. They could have waited out the
year to receive public assistance benefits, to get medical help
and to vote. But the purpose here is not to make sense of Justice
Rehnquist's distinctions, but to demonstrate that those distinc-
tions, however illusory and inconsistent with reality, neverthe-
less are consistent with the pattern of total deprivation that has
come to characterize the fabric of the Court's poverty law
pronouncements.
d. Access To Courts
As Sosna suggests, the rise and fall of Boddie falls clearly
within the same pattern. Boddie's holding, that a state denies
due process to indigent divorce plaintiffs by requiring payment
of court costs which are beyond their means to pay,86 rests on a
dual rationale. First, relying upon precedent acknowledging free-
dom to marry as a basic civil right, the Boddie Court stressed
that marriage is a basic human relationship involving interests
of fundamental importance.8 Second, it reasoned that since a
state holds a monopoly on the peaceful dispute resolution mech-
anism, a divorce plaintiff seeking to terminate her marriage has
no choice but to invoke that mechanism by going to court.88
That this second factor, monopoly, would come to be viewed
as a rephrasing of the total deprivation element, is illustrated by
the Court's subsequent literal readings of Boddie.8 9 In United
of totally denying them the opportunity to vote." Id. at 334-35. This flaw is basic to
voting residency rules: "Durational residency requirements completely bar from voting
all residents not meeting the fixed durational standards." Id.
83. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 410.
84. 401 U.S. 371 (1971), discussed infra text accompanying notes 86-95.
85. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406.
86. Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
87. Id. at 377.
88. Id. at 381-82.
89. Further evidence of the present Court's recasting of Boddie in absolute depriva-
tion terms is found in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), in which Justice Stewart,
concurring in the Court's repudiation of a Wisconsin law prohibiting those with out-
standing support obligations from marrying, read Boddie as holding that "a person's in-
ability to pay money demanded by the State does not justify the total deprivation of a
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States v. Kras,90 the bankruptcy filing fee (then $50) withstood
a due process and equal protection challenge, in part because
the Court saw a difference in degree in the scope of the depriva-
tion and in the reach of the judicial monopoly.9' Justice Black-
mun felt that bankruptcy is not the exclusive means of adjusting
the debtor-creditor relationship; negotiated agreements, other
voluntary private arrangements, or the passage of applicable
statutes of limitations were viewed by the majority as alterna-
tives to judicial proceedings.92 Similarly in Ortwein v. Schwab, 3
the Court upheld a $25 filing fee for judicial appeals from ad-
verse welfare administrative decisions.9e Again, the Court con-
vinced itself that the deprivation was not total. The plaintiffs
had already received the administrative hearing that Goldberg v.
Kelly" mandates. Since due process does not require an appel-
late system in the first place,9 the Court reasoned that due pro-
cess is not infringed where the recipient has already been pro-
vided an administrative hearing to review his claim. 7
e. Public Benefits
The public benefits cases themselves sound the total depri-
vation theme. Goldberg stands at the forefront. Without a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing, Justice Brennan wrote, public
assistance recipients face the real possibility of completely losing
"the very means by which to live," the means "to obtain essen-
tial food, clothing, housing and medical care."9 In Shapiro, the
plaintiffs faced exactly the same dilemma; no AFDC benefits on
which to live were available during their first year of residency, a
time when their need may well be greatest.9 9
constitutionally protected liberty" (emphasis added). Id. at 394.
90. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
91. Id. at 443-49.
92. Id. at 445-46.
93. 410 U.S. 656 (1973). Even as limited by Kras and Ortwein, however, Boddie still
has force. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (distinguishing Kras and Ort-
wein, finding Boddie controlling holding that an indigent defendant in a paternity suit is
entitled to state financed blood tests).
94. Id. at 658-61.
95. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (discussed infra).
96. 410 U.S. at 660.
97. Id. at 659, citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266-71.
98. 397 U.S. at 264.
99. 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1968).
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In Dandridge v. Williams'"0 and Jefferson v. Hackney,' on
the other hand, some benefits were provided to all qualified re-
cipients. The plaintiffs' claims were not rooted in absolute depri-
vation but went to the fairness of the relative allocation of bene-
fits under the applicable statutory scheme.10 2 The large families
in Dandridge asserted that their benefits were inadequate to
meet their increased standard of need. 108 The AFDC recipients
in Jefferson argued that their standard of need was not being
met to the statistically comparable extent of recipients in other
need-based programs. 0 4 In both cases, the claim was not that
destitute people received no help from the state, but that the
benefits paid were inadequate to meet the plaintiffs' needs.
The claims in Mathews v. Eldridge,10 5 holding that proce-
dural due process does not require pre-termination hearings in
Social Security Disability (SSD) cases,' 06 were re-shaped by the
Court in the same light. "As Goldberg illustrates," Justice Pow-
ell began, "the degree of potential deprivation that may be cre-
ated by a particular decision is a factor"'107 in determining the
adequacy of state administrative proceedings. To the Mathews
majority, the deprivation involved when SSD benefits are cut off
without a hearing is somehow less than total, as opposed to the
holding of total deprivation in Goldberg. The difference, the ma-
jority explains, is that SSD is not exclusively a need-based pro-
gram, and other government assistance programs, such as food
stamps and SSI, can cushion part of the blow. 0 8 To the dissent,
the facts that following termination of benefits the Eldridge
family was faced with foreclosure proceedings, had their furni-
ture repossessed, and were forced to sleep in one bed, raised cer-
tain existential questions about the accuracy of the majority's
perception.' 0 9 But again, the thinking process, marked by a total
deprivation analysis, is noteworthy at this point, rather than the
100. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
101. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
102. 397 U.S. at 472-73, 406 U.S. at 536-38.
103. 397 U.S. at 480-82.
104. 406 U.S. at 537-38.
105. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
106. Id. at 332-49.
107. Id. at 341.
108. Id. at 342 n.27.
109. Id. at 349-50.
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particular application of that analysis.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno'" and
its companion, United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry,"' round out the total deprivation analysis in the public
benefits area. In Moreno all households containing an unrelated
member, including "so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie com-
munes',"11 2 were entirely excluded from participation in the food
stamp program.113 The Court refused to sanction this wholesale
exclusion of "essential federal food assistance to all otherwise
eligibile households containing unrelated members," ' , noting
that the practical effect of the statutory bar was to withhold
food purchasing power from "only those persons who are so des-
perately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter
their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.M1 5
In Murry the deprivation was also absolute. No food stamp
benefits were available to any household containing a person
over 18 claimed as a tax dependent by someone outside the
household."' Again, the Court invalidated the wholesale denial
of any benefits for this insular class.117
The Rodriguez dictum, that some minimal quantum of a
government service or an important right (there, public educa-
tion) may be constitutionally compelled in cases of complete ex-
clusions of otherwise eligible beneficiaries," 8 as fleshed out in
Plyler,"9e is thus properly viewed not as an aberration but as a
reflection of the total deprivation theme that may be heard in
110. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
111. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). While Moreno rests on equal protection, and Murry on due
process, both define the minimum content of rationality under the "any rational basis"
(non) standard. For a more recent strengthening or reinvigoration of rationality review,
see, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cent., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), finding an equal
protection violation, purportedly under rationality review, in a city's requirement of a
special use permit for a proposed group home for the mentally retarded. The expansive
potential of this decision for advocates for the homeless is explored in a separate article.
in this issue. See Margulies, The Newest Equal Protection, 3 N.Y.L.S. HuM. RTS. ANN.
359(1986) (this issue).
112. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
113. Id. at 530.
114. Id. at 535-36.
115. Id. at 538.
116. Murry, 413 U.S. at 511-12.
117. Id. at 512-14.
118. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37; see text accompanying note 25, supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 26-35, supra.
268 [Vol. III
A LEGAL ACTIVIST ANALYSIS
the Court's rather limited forays into the poverty field.
C. A Good But Imperfect Theory
A claim for affirmative injunctive relief to compel the provi-
sion of shelter for the homeless fits snugly into the total depriva-
tion mold. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of complete
exclusion; the homeless, by definition, are totally without shel-
ter. It is quite difficult to posit a more important right, a more
basic need, than life. Witness the Lucite 6.
Advocates should nevertheless carefully consider the weak-
nesses and risks inherent in total deprivation analysis. Like any
model, it is imperfect. Its flaws are readily identifiable.
First, like all theories seeking unity in the diversity of Su-
preme Court pronouncements, the total deprivation model is
hardly universal; it certainly does not cover every case. For ex-
ample, when applied to major housing law cases, cracks in the
model are evident. True, Lindsey v. Normet,120 where the Court
suggested that the constitution does not guarantee minimally
adequate shelter,"2 ' can be explained in terms of total depriva-
tion. The plaintiff-tenants, who challenged, inter alia, Oregon's
exclusion of implied warranty of habitability defenses from for-
cible entry and detainer actions, 22 were not absolutely barred.
They could assert such claims in separate actions, assuming that
at that point in the development of Oregon's landlord-tenant
law, a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability
constituted a cognizable claim. Also, unlike the homeless, the te-
nants in Lindsey had some housing. Their claim was, in part,
that it was inadequate due to their landlord's failure to make
necessary repairs. 28 But James v. Valtierra,124 where the Court
sustained a California law subjecting only low-rent housing
projects to local referenda voter apprqval,"25 is more difficult to
explain under total deprivation analysis. The deprivation of af-
fordable housing was clearly total as to those directly affected by
the local referenda (rejecting proposed low income housing
120. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
121. Id. at 74.
122. Id. at 64, 66-67 n.12.
123. Id. at 66.
124. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
125. Id. at 140-43.
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projects-about one-half of all such referenda) at the time of the
lower court's decision in James.'2 6
Second, whether the total deprivation model works depends
to a significant extent upon how the interest at stake is defined.
In Griffin, for example, the deprivation is not total if the defend-
ant's interest is defined as access to some appellate review.'2 7
Under the Illinois scheme, indigent defendants could obtain re-
view of constitutional claims without providing a trial transcript
to the appellate court. Only trial errors were unreviewable with-
out a transcript. 12 But if the interest is identified as obtaining
for the indigent as adequate an appellate review as is available
to the affluent, clearly the deprivation is total for the poor de-
fendant who cannot pay a transcript fee, as in Griffin, or afford
counsel, as in Douglas.
This point is highlighted in Mayer v. Chicago,129 where the
Court, per Justice Brennan, struck down an Illinois Supreme
Court rule that provided for free transcripts only in felony ap-
peals.3 0 Justice Brennan conceded that a transcript was not a
condition precedent to appeal."' The deprivation was not abso-
lute (in the Rehnquist sense of stripping indigents of all rights
to appeal), but the Griffin principle, as defined by the Mayer
Court, is broader. It "is a flat prohibition against pricing indi-
gent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be availa-
ble to others able to pay their own way.' ' 3 2 In other words, "the
duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and ef-
fective an appellate review as that given appellants with
funds."3 8 When viewed in this light, an indigent non-felony de-
fendant who is priced out of an appellate review as adequate as
that enjoyed by the affluent faces complete deprivation.
The significance of interest identification can also be seen in
the civil law counterparts of the criminal fee cases. There is re-
ally little room for argument in Boddie that the deprivation
faced by an indigent prospective plaintiff unable to pay filing
126. Valtierra v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
127. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 14-15.
128. Id. at 15.
129. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
130. Id. at 190-99.
131. Id. at 194.
132. Id. at 196-97.
133. Id. at 193-94.
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fees and sheriff's costs is not total. She is forever barred from
access to state divorce courts and is therefore permanently
locked into an intolerable marriage relationship. But the depri-
vation of the interests affected in the post-Boddie civil fee cases
is equally absolute. For the indigent debtor unable to advance
the bankruptcy filing fee, or even to pay it in installments as is
permitted, the denial of access to the judicial forum (the only
effective dispute resolution mechanism that is realistically avail-
able to the debtor) is total. He is permanently locked into the
short end of the debtor-creditor relationship. And for the public
assistance recipient whose claim has been denied at the adminis-
trative level and who cannot afford the judicial appellate filing
fee, the interest at stake is not access to the administrative hear-
ing process, deemed sufficient in Ortwein, but access to the ini-
tial, entry level of judicial review-a first day in court-to cor-
rect administrative errors in a forum independent of the
administrative system.
Third, as these cases suggest, the total deprivation theory
tends to mask significant regressions by the Court. Kras and
Ortwein can be more readily and satisfactorily understood, if not
justified, as exercises in retrenchment. The Court may well have
been uncomfortable with the tremendously far-reaching implica-
tions of Boddie's overtones of access to civil courts. Kras and
Ortwein provided opportunities to call a halt, to try to isolate
Boddie as an aberration,134 just as Rodriguez checks the sugges-
tion in earlier cases'35 that poverty based discriminations are in-
herently suspect, and just as Ross v. Moffitt draws the boundary
line around the indigent's right to counsel on appeal.
Fourth, the total deprivation model is simplistic. It empha-
sizes but one of many factors that may very well be operating in
the Court's analysis. It ignores, for example, the degree to which
the Court at any given time will take a realistic view of poverty
as beyond the individual's control or, on the other hand, will
134. But see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (discussed supra note 89).
135. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored")
(citation omitted), and McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1960) ("[A]
careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the
basis of wealth or race, two factors which would independently render a classification
highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.")
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take a harsher, moralistic view as expressed, for example, in Jus-
tice Blackmun's unfortunate comment in Kras to the effect that
if the debtor really needed the bankruptcy remedy, the minimal
price of a filing fee (the proportional equivalent of a "pack or
two of cigarettes" per day), would be within his "able bodied
reach." s" Furthermore, the deprivation focus redirects attention
from the entire host of factors that enter into the appellate pro-
cess, from the relative weight to be given to the ever present
fiscal interests of the state, to the degree of justification that will
be demanded, to the means-ends segment of the constitutional
equation, and to the often determinative question of where the
burdens of proof and persuasion will be placed.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the deprivation
model is a dangerous one if misunderstood. To focus upon the
degree of deprivation suffered might be misconstrued as an ar-
gument that relief should be granted only in the clearest cases of
absolute deprivation, of maximum suffering. Thus, what Profes-
sor Kramer 8 7  identifies as "constitutional words of
harm"-words such as "deny," "infringe," and "de-
prive"-might be interpreted to offer lesser coverage than pres-
ently provided if they are only to be activated upon a showing of
total rather than relative deprivation. Equal protection, after all,
concerns differences in relative8 treatment between similarly
situated people.
The total deprivation principle must therefore be properly
understood. It emphasizes that in those situations where a life
sustaining benefit (for example, shelter) is totally denied, the
government's justification must be not just at least as strong as,
but more compelling than, the need denied. The principle
clearly does not mean that judicial relief is to be withheld in all
other contexts, especially in situations involving relative depri-
vations or allocations of limited public resources in ways in
which all potential beneficiaries receive at least some benefits.
136. Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.
137. Dean John Kramer, Georgetown University Law Center.
138. Similarly, poverty itself involves both absolute deprivation-for example, the in-
ability to purchase an adequate, nutritious diet-and relative deprivation-having less
income than others in society. Law, Economic Justice supra note 3, at 149. By emphasiz-
ing absolute deprivation, the total denial theory tends to divert needed attention from
the other half of the poverty equation.
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The strength of this model, however, lies precisely in these
weaknesses. By underscoring the severity of the deprivation in
terms of what the denial means to the victim's ability to survive,
the total deprivation theory holds some promise for the home-
less. That promise may come within reach far faster, however,
through less direct judicial strategies than investing enormous
time, research and litigation resources in trying to establish, di-
rectly through a test case approach, a broad based "right to shel-
ter"-an idea that will no doubt strike many courts in these con-
servative times as a novel, far reaching notion best left to
legislative (in)action.
II. INDIRECT JUDICIAL STRATEGIES
Indirect judicial strategies-including those grounded in
state law governing welfare, mental health and sex discrimina-
tion-offer additional footholds to the homeless in their search
for shelter. As discussed more fully in Part IV,13e one of the core
precepts of legal activism is that indirect, roundabout, creative
approaches to a problem may often prove more effective than a
direct assault. This principle of indirection holds a lesson for
those seeking shelter for the homeless. Rather than a frontal at-
tack via a "right to shelter" test case, side door approaches may
provide easier access to the same house. Even a brief look at the
nut to be cracked suggests that a sledgehammer approach may
be neither wise nor necessary.
The "homeless" are not an homogenous group. They suffer
differing, individualized hardships. In the rural, orchard dotted,
south central Pennsylvania county in which I practice poverty
law, people in need of emergency shelter include migrant
farmworkers who arrive before area work camps open, or are
awaiting their first paychecks to pay security deposits or ad-
vance rent; the children and spouses of migrant workers who
find themselves excluded by the policy of some area fruit grow-
ers to house only the worker and not his family; homeless
women excluded from a small (12 bed) area shelter and from
church mission shelters in adjacent counties which house only
men; transients; county prison residents who upon release are
faced with no place to live; tenants facing expiration of their
139. Text accompanying notes 267-91.
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leases with no alternative, affordable housing in sight; tenants
evicted, often through self-help means (for example, utility shut-
offs or padlocking), who have nowhere to go; individuals between
18 and 45 who rely on state financed public assistance benfits as
their sole source of income, who are classified as "able bodied"
and therefore only "transitionally needy" under a 1982 legisla-
tive purge of the state's welfare rolls,4 who are then terminated
from public assistance after 90 days, and have no money to pay
rent to keep the only shelter they have; people suffering from
mental or emotional problems; and those who rely exclusively
upon other government benefit programs (for example, Social
Security Disability), whose benefits are delayed or terminated.
This rough profile of the homeless population is somewhat
different from that of the street people who sleep on the steam
grates of downtown Los Angeles or Washington, D.C. Yet com-
mon denominators begin to emerge as an advocate studies the
rural and urban homeless profiles. Significant subgroups within
the homeless population begin to take shape. The mentally ill
are one. Statistics from New York are illustrative. Since 1968,
New York has discharged 65,000 patients out of a total 89,000
people residing in state psychiatric hospitals. An estimated
47,000 mentally ill people live in New York City alone. Of these,
only 424 now reside in halfway houses.14 1 Many of the rest are
on the streets, homeless.
Women and children are becoming another significant sub-
group of the homeless population, as are those who exist on gov-
ernment benefit programs. A 1982 Baltimore study, for example,
disclosed that the city's homeless included adults between 20
and 29 (42%), families with children (23%), General Assistance
recipients (25%), AFDC recipients (20%), SSI recipients (10%),
140. See Pa. Welfare Reform Act, Pub. L. 231, No. 75, § 10 (April 8, 1982). General
welfare recipients can be classified as transitionally needy by the Pa. Department of
Public Welfare under this statute, qualifying for only ninety days worth of general assis-
tance. This was applied to recipients currently receiving year-long assistance. See Ream
v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 93 Pa. Commw. 190, 500 A.2d 1274 (1985); Chatham v. Dept.
Pub. Welfare, 90 Pa. Commw. 44, 494 A.2d 18 (1985); Knier v. Dept. Pub. Welfare, 84
Pa. Commw. 609, 480 A.2d 369 (1984); Fisher v. Dept. Pub. Welfare, 82 Pa. Commw. 116,
475 A.2d 873 (1984) (plaintiffs challenging the classification).
141. Werner, On the Streets: Homelessness Causes and Solutions, CLEARINGHOUSE
REV., May 1984, at 13.
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and those without any income (25%).142
These insights into who the homeless are invite court strate-
gies tailored to the needs of particular homeless individuals and
subgroups.
A. State Mental Health Law
State mental health law is a potential source of support for
the shelter and health needs of the mentally ill homeless. Klos-
termann v. Cuomo"3 well illustrates this potential. The Klos-
termann plaintiffs were former residents of state mental health
institutions who found themselves homeless after being dis-
charged from institutional placement to a "least restrictive envi-
ronment."'' 44 In their cases, because of inadequate funding for
community facilities, the least restrictive alternative turned out
to be the streets of New York City. The plaintiffs in a consoli-
dated case, Joanne S. v. Carey,"15 were 11 patients in a New
York psychiatric hospital who were ready to be released but
could not be because they lacked adequate residential place-
ments. 46 At the time their complaint was filed in August 1982,
they had been waiting as long as one year for shelter to become
available in the community."1
7
Both sets of plaintiffs sued the state on both constitu-
tional 48 (the right to treatment, including aftercare in the least
restrictive environment and freedom from personal harm, as
protected by the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments) and
state statutory grounds (New York's Mental Hygiene Law)." 49
Generally, these mentally ill individuals demanded a community
placement that would guarantee continued treatment and ade-
quate housing. Specifically, as the New York Court of Appeals
described their claims, "[p]laintiffs contend that they are enti-
tled to appropriate residential placement, supervision, and care,
142. Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Housing
and Community Development, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 632 (1982).
143. 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
144. Id. at 531, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
145. 61 N.Y.2d at 534, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 532, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
149. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f)-(h) (McKinney 1978).
1986] 275
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
including follow-ups to verify that their placement remains
appropriate. '" 1 50
The state law ground for plaintiffs' claim of entitlement was
New York's mental health statute, which requires that a written
service plan be prepared for patients prior to discharge into the
community.'8 1 These individual service plans must include an
identification of the patient's needs for supervision and after-
care, and a "specific recommendation of the type of residence in
which the patient is to live."' 52 Additionally, the statute requires
the director of the state treatment facility to prepare, implement
and monitor a comprehensive oversight program.' 83 This indi-
vidualized program is meant "to determine whether the resi-
dence in which such client or patient is living is adequate and
appropriate for the needs of such patient; to verify that such
patient is receiving the services specified [in the written service
plan], and. . . to take steps to assure the provision of any addi-
tional services.' '15
The lower court in Klostermann rejected these claims as
nonjusticiable, reasoning that mandamus would entangle the
court in endless supervision of a series of continuous acts'55 and,
besides, the statutory duty is one involving discretion and judg-
ment, making mandamus inappropriate. 56 The New York Court
of Appeals, unpersuaded by this orthodox judicial response, re-
versed. 5 " Without reaching the merits, the court conceded that
"[g]enerally, the manner by which the State addresses complex
societal and governmental issues is a subject left to the discre-
tion of the legislative and executive branches;"'5 8 however, these
cases, the appellate court insisted, are different. Because plan-
tiffs "assert that the [liegislature has mandated certain pro-
grams and that the executive branch has failed to deliver the
services [the courts are] . . . [t]he appropriate forum to deter-
150. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 531, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
151. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f) (McKinney 1978).
152. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(g) (McKinney 1978).
153. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(h)1, 2, 3 (McKinney 1978).
154. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(h) (McKinney 1978).
155. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 533, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
156. Id. at 534, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
157. Id. at 541, 463 N.E.2d at 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
158. Id. at 535-36, 463 N.E.2d at 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
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mine the respective rights and obligations of the parties."'" 9 Es-
sentially, plaintiffs were saying that they were not receiving ser-
vices, including shelter, that state law said they should as
necessary components of continuing mental health treatment.
Advocates should consider whether a similar state law claim
can be advanced on behalf of the mentally ill homeless in their
communities. Pennsylvania law, for example, while not as spe-
cific as its New York counterpart, offers some leverage. Pennsyl-
vania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966160
imposes on the state the power and duty "to assure within the
State the availability and equitable provision of adequate
mental health and mental retardation services for all persons
who need them, regardless of religion, race . . . residence, or ec-
onomic or social status."'' Counties, in turn, have the responsi-
bility for establishing mental health programs "for the preven-
tion of mental disability, and for the diagnosis, care, treatment
[and] rehabilitation" of the mentaly ill.'6 2 Included among the
services within "the duty of local authorities in cooperation with
the department [of public welfare] to insure" are "[aiftercare
services for persons released from [s]tate and [c]ounty facili-
ties."'63 Aftercare services are defined broadly as services
designed to assist the individual in maintaining himself as a
member of society, and specifically include halfway houses.'14 Fi-
nally, Pennsylvania's mental health law gives counties the power
to provide to the mentally ill "[a]ny other service or program
designed to prevent mental disability or the necessity of admit-
ting or committing the mentally disabled to a facility."' 65
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that
the state's statutory commitment to the mentally ill is
mandatory, not optional and is not conditional on the availabil-
159. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 536, 463 N.E.2d at 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53.
160. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§
4104-4704 (Purdon 1969).
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969).
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4301(a) (Purdon 1969).
163. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4301(d)(6) (Purdon 1969). See also, Mental Health Pro-
cedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7116 (Purdon 1969), which requires county mental
health programs to "receive referrals from [s]tate-operated facilities" and to assume re-
sponsibility "for the treatment needs of county residents discharged from institutions
pursuant to" the Act.
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4102 (Purdon 1969).
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4301(e)(3) (Purdon 1969).
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ity of funding. In re Schmidt166 involved a skirmish between the
state and one of its counties over which was responsible for pro-
viding an appropriate placement suited to the individual needs
of a severely retarded adult, who required more supervision than
was available at the state facility located in the county.167 The
county had no existing alternative facility that would meet the
plaintiff's need for extensive supervision. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ruled that the state had ultimate placement re-
sponsibility under its statutory duty to provide mental health
services to all in need of them, including plaintiff. 1 8 "The state
will not be allowed to ignore that responsibility," the court in-
sisted, "by stating that an appropriate facility is not immedi-
ately available."16
While fixing ultimate responsibility for plaintiff's case with
the state, the Schmidt court also rejected the county's position
that its statutory power to establish "additional services and
programs" designed to prevent institutionalization only required
it to provide interim care until the state arranged a long-term
placement.17 0 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the statu-
tory grant of authority to establish preventive programs as
"more than a mere grant of power to be used at the county's
option.1' 71 Rather, "the legislative scheme was designed to re-
quire the county to provide those supportive services where they
would eliminate the necessity of institutionalization, even where
those services would be required on a long term basis. "172
Providing shelter to the mentally ill homeless might well fit
within the broad definition of "aftercare services" contained in
Pennsylvania's mental health law statute. 7" Shelter is essential
to "maintaining" the individual as a functioning member of soci-
ety-indeed, as a functioning individual at all. Under the
Schmidt rationale, the lack of a shelter in the community should
not be an acceptable defense. The state and the county must
respond to the mental health needs of the individual, once those
166. 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
167. Id. at 90-91, 429 A.2d at 633.
168. Id. at 98, 429 A.2d at 637.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 94-95, 429 A.2d at 635-36.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 95, 429 A.2d at 635-36.
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4301(d)(6) (Purdon 1969).
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needs are established.
Additionally, the statutory power of Pennsylvania counties
to set up programs designed to prevent institutionalization of
the mentally ill provides local advocates with an important ne-
gotiating tool. Even if a lawsuit to compel the state or county to
provide a shelter for the mentally ill homeless might not ulti-
mately succeed-perhaps for lack of sufficient specificity in the
above statutory language-the argument that state statutory
power exists to provide shelter to this significant segment of the
homeless population should not be overlooked in a community's
shelter campaign. It is helpful to remember that Klostermann
and Schmidt are merely two judicial manifestations of the
broader contemporary social trend toward community based
placements for the mentally ill. As the New York Court of Ap-
peals noted in Klostermann, the plaintiffs were or were about to
be "discharged as part of the [s]tate's policy to release patients
to less restrictive, community-based residences."17 Similarly,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Schmidt stressed that state
statutory law was firmly behind "the concept of normalization
and the adoption of the doctrine of least restrictive
alternative. '17 5
State statutory provisions such as those utilized in Klos-
termann and Schmidt should therefore be linked with this
broader movement toward de-institutionalization and least re-
strictive placements by advocates seeking community shelters
for the mentally ill homeless. This linkage is particularly impor-
tant where it can be established that the state's failure to fund
community based placements for the mentally ill is a contribut-
ing factor in the homelessness equation.
B. State Welfare Law
State welfare law may provide a basis for sheltering the
homeless. Precedent from West Virginia and New York is illus-
trative of the very few 17 examples of the use of state welfare
174. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 531, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
175. Schmidt, 494 Pa. at 98, 429 A.2d at 637.
176. Another example of the affirmative use of state public assistance law on behalf
of the homeless is Matickla v. Atlantic City, No. L-8306084E (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Feb. 16, 1984) (restraining order for emergency shelter and immediate assistance). There,
the Public Advocate of New Jersey represented homeless individuals in Atlantic City in
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laws to compel government provision of shelter for homeless
people who, almost universally, are indigent. The lesson of these
cases is instructive.
The plaintiffs in Hodge v. Ginsberg17 were persons who had
no shelter and who, as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals phrased it, "therefore [were] forced to spend their days
and nights on public streets, alleys, riverbanks, and other vari-
ous outdoor locations.' ' 78 They sued in mandamus on constitu-
tional and state statutory grounds, seeking an order directing
the state welfare department to provide them with emergency
shelter, food and medical care. 179 They won.
They won because they successfully invoked state welfare
code provisions requiring the state to provide protective services
to "incapacitated adults," defined as "any person who by reason
of physical, mental or other infirmity is unable to independently
carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life
and reasonable health." 180 Homeless persons, the court reasoned,
their suit for injunctive relief requiring the city to provide safe, suitable emergency shel-
ter. Plaintiffs invoked both the state constitutional provision recognizing the "natural
and inalienable rights" of persons to enjoy life, liberty, property and happiness (N.J.
CONST. art. 1), and the state public assistance statute and regulations affording indigents
a right to immediate assistance, arguably including emergency shelter. The state Supe-
rior Court granted preliminary injunctive relief on the asserted public assistance law
grounds. See also Lubetkin v. City Manager, No. 0280505 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 4,
1984), a class action on behalf of homeless Hartford residents seeking to compel the city
to provide plaintiffs with emergency food and shelter pursuant to state welfare laws. A
yet more recent example is Rodgers v. Gibson, No. L.17401-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
filed Sept. 6, 1985) (reported in 19 Clearinghouse Review No. 8,892 (Dec. 1985)). This is
an action by the New Jersey Public Advocate on behalf of homeless people in Newark
for failure by the city to shelter the homeless. The suit invokes the state's constitution,
state general assistance laws, and state law protections for mentally handicapped
citizens.
For an excellent summary of litigation efforts to address homelessness, based not
only on public assistance but a variety of grounds, see, Homelessness: A Litigation
Roundup, 14 HOUSING L. BULL. 1 (November/December 1984).
177. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983). Note that intervening plaintiffs in Hodge include
a local association for retarded citizens, highlighting the linkage to the mental health and
mental retardation communities, and a local coalition seeking emergency shelter for the
homeless, illustrating the effectiveness of broad based, community organizing. Amicus in
Hodge included an organization which provided daily meals to the indigent and a Catho-
lic "worker house of hospitality" which provided overnight shelter.
178. Id. at 247.
179. Id. at 245.
180. W. VA. CODE § 9-6-1(4)(1984).
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fit squarely within that definition;"8 ' consequently, the court or-
dered the state welfare department "to provide emergency shel-
ter, food and medical care" to plaintiffs and those similarly situ-
ated, pursuant to the welfare code and implementing
regulations.18 2
In doing so, the West Virginia Supreme Court pointed to an
important link between statutory entitlements and the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process: "Inherent in the republican
form of government established by our State Constitution is a
concept of due process that insures that the people receive the
benefit of legislative enactments.' 1 83 This is precisely the theme
struck in Klostermann v. Cuomo, reviewed above in the discus-
sion on state mental health law. 14 The message is an important
one for the homeless and their advocates. The idea is simple.
Once the legislature sets up a statutory scheme of services, and
especially when the details of that scheme are fleshed out in im-
plementing administrative regulations, individuals are entitled
to receive those services.
Callahan v. Carey8 5 further illustrates the potential of state
welfare law in addressing the needs of the homeless. The Calla-
han plaintiffs, homeless men in New York City, obtained pre-
liminary injunctive relief in state court requiring the city to pro-
vide an additional 750 shelter beds. The court recognized a right
to shelter for the homeless.'8 " Plaintiffs relied in part on state
welfare law provisions imposing on the state the responsibility
"to provide adequately for those unable to maintain them-
selves,"' 8 7 and obligating New York City to assume responsibil-
ity "for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is
found in its territory and who is in need of public assistance and
care which he is unable to provide for himself." 8 8
In their brief, plaintiffs argued that these statutory duties
were mandatory, not optional, and required the state to provide
181. 303 S.E.2d at 250.
182. Id. at 251.
183. Id. at 247, (quoting Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1981)).
184. See text accompanying notes 143-59, supra.
185. Callahan v. Carey, No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 1979) (reported in
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4).
186. Id.
187. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 1983).
188. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62(1) (McKinney 1983).
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New York City's homeless "the most basic life-sustaining assis-
tance, namely shelter, in a minimally decent fashion." 189 The
trial court cited these state welfare law provisions as the basis,
in part,190 for its decision that "the Bowery derelicts are entitled
to board and lodging" and that the state and city defendants
must therefore "provide at least 750 beds (and board for 750
men) for the helpless and hopeless men of the Bowery. '"191 (A
subsequent order extending the relief to homeless women is
noted below in the discussion of prohibitions on sex discrimina-
tion as a tool for combating homelessness).1 92
Hodge and Callahan are obvious clues to advocates to look
for at least partial answers to the homelessness problem in state
public assistance legislation. In Pennsylvania, that search proves
revealing. The legislative intent of the state's Public Welfare
Code is typically broad: "to promote the welfare and happiness
of all the people of the [c]ommonwealth, by providing public as-
sistance to all of its needy and distressed. '"I" "Assistance" is de-
fined to include "money, services, goods, [and] shelter . . . for
needy persons who reside in Pennsylvania. . . . and for needy,
homeless or transient persons.11 94 Implementing regulations
provide a maximum grant of $100, available no more than once
in a twelve month period, to homeless persons, but require that
the homelessness be caused by an "emergency," and condition
eligibility on a showing that the individual has "obtained or
committed himself. . . to new living accommodations" (that is,
has located a permanent residence). 9 5 The intent is to provide
189. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 36, Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10,
col. 4.
190. In its footnote containing "[tihe legal authorities for the decision," (Callahan,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5), the Callahan court also cited N.Y. CONST. art.
XviI, § 1, which requires the State to provide for the "aid, care and support of the
needy in such a manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine"; Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 32 N.E.2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975)
which held that the constitutional mandate to provide for the needy is not conditional on
reimbursement from the state; and N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. A, § 604.1.0(b) (1978), which
requires the city to provide "plain and wholesome food and lodging for one night, free of
charge" to shelter applicants who, in the city's judgment , "may be properly received."
191. Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5.
192. See note 199 infra and accompanying text.
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (Purdon, 1968).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 402 (Purdon 1968) (emphasis added).
195. 55 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 289.4(a)(2)(iii)(B) (Shepard's 1982).
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help in paying the first month's rent or a security deposit re-
quired at a new residence." Those without alternative shelter,
by definition homeless, nevertheless would not qualify absent a
showing that they have found shelter.
This "Catch-22" and the restrictive implementing regula-
tions that create it, as well as the miserly amount of the state's
emergency, one-time shelter grant for the homeless, raise inter-
esting, challengeable issues. The state welfare department's im-
plementing regulations raise serious questions of consistency not
only with the general intent of the welfare statute expressed
above, but with the parallel, more exacting statutory require-
ment that the Department of Public Welfare "shall . . . take
measures not inconsistent with the purposes of this article; and
when other funds or facilities . . . are inadequate or unavailable
to provide for special needs of individuals eligible for assistance;
and to relieve suffering and distress arising from handicaps and
infirmities." 107
Under the Klostermann (mental health law) and Hodge and
Callahan (welfare law) concept that people are entitled to re-
ceive the benefits of legislation, these Pennsylvania Welfare
Code provisions may well provide advocates with legal pegs on
which to hang a right to emergency shelter for the indigent
homeless. Also, like the state's mental health law provisions em-
powering government to establish additional programs for those
with designated needs, these welfare law counterparts offer ad-
vocates additional negotiating leverage, as well as focal points
for media and community attention in the gap between what the
state or municipality could be doing and what it is doing to shel-
ter the homeless.
C. State Sex Discrimination Laws
State laws barring sex discrimination in housing offer an ad-
ditional weapon to combat homelessness by sheltering homeless
women. As mentioned in the preceding discussion on welfare law
as a basis for seeking shelter for the homeless, the original order
in Callahan v. Carey mandated that the government defendants
provide an additional 750 beds for "the helpless and hopeless
196. Id.
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 408(a) (Purdon 1968) (emphasis added).
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men of the Bowery."198 The relief was subsequently extended to
include homeless women. 19 The New York court had apparently
overlooked a significant component of the contemporary home-
less scene. Advocates should not.
Like state mental health and welfare law, state statutes
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex add to the arsenal
in the fight against homelessness. A look at Pennsylvania law
again suggests the potential force of this state statutory
ammunition.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act20° prohibits dis-
crimination in certain housing on grounds, inter alia, of sex. In
this sense, its coverage is coextensive with federal law.2 01 How-
ever, as is true in relying upon state mental health and welfare
statutes, a close reading of the statutory scheme is a must.
Pennsylvania's anti-discrimination statute applies to "com-
mercial housing," defined as "housing accommodations held or
offered for sale or rent . . .,. Unless rent is charged, or an
inventive argument demonstrating compliance with traditional
lease formation requirements is developed, community shelters
would seem to be beyond the reach of "commercial housing."
Such a conclusion might, of course, be fatal. Pennsylvania courts
have made it clear that neither they nor the administering
agency (the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission) have
the authority to protect against discrimination in private, non-
commercial housing.0 8
Continued reading of the statute, however, opens up a back
198. Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5.
199. See Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc.2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1983), rev'd 98 AD.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744. While the appellate court agreed that
"homeless women are constitutionally entitled to treatment equal to that accorded
homeless men," it found that "the record disclose[d] factual issues as to whether that
right had been violated, and accordingly reverse[d]" the lower court's grant of summary
judgment. 98 A.D.2d at 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Purdon 1964).
201. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31 (1982).
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(j) (Purdon 1964). This definition of commercial
housing is more restrictive than earlier versions of this section, which defined "housing
accommodations" broadly to include any building used as a residence or sleeping place
for one or more persons. This earlier version would more easily accommodate shelters for
homeless.
203. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Borough of Bendersville, 24 Pa.
Commw. 503, 357 A.2d 236 (1976).
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door for the homeless. Gender-based discrimination is forbidden
not only in commercial housing, but also in places of "public ac-
commodation. ' 20 4 This term embraces "any place which is open
to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, includ-
ing . . . inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, motels, whether con-
ducted for the entertainment of transient guests or for the ac-
commodation of those seeking health ... ."05 The New York
court in Callahan may have referred to the street residents of
the Bowery as "destitute and homeless alcoholics, addicts, men-
tally impaired derelicts, flotsam and jetsam, ' '20 6 but the home-
less, by whatever name, must be conceded to be members of the
"general public" within Pennsylvania law's "public accommoda-
tion" provision. As such, the women among them are entitled to
the protection of the statutory ban on sex discrimination in
places of public accommodation.
That protection is important. As discussed at the beginning
of Part I1,207 one of the contributing causes of homelessness in
the rural area in which I work is the exclusion of women from
area mission shelters. The Human Relations Act would appear
to offer homeless women a key to opening such shelters.
The fact that some of these existing shelters are church op-
erated or at least church affiliated, however, constitutes a sepa-
rate lock that must be opened. Pennsylvania's anti-discrimina-
tion statute specifically exempts from coverage religious,
charitable or fraternal organizations:
Nothing in this . . . section shall bar any religious or de-
nominational institution ... which is operated, super-
vised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious
organization or any bona fide private or fraternal organi-
zation from giving preference to persons of the same reli-
gion or denomination . . . or from making such selection
as is calculated by such organization to promote the reli-
gious principles or the aims ... for which it is estab-
lished .... 20
204. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 954(1) (Purdon 1964).
205. Id.
206. Calahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979 at 10, col. 4.
207. See text accompanying note 140, supra.
208. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 955(i)(2) (Purdon 1964).
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Churches today may nevertheless have difficulty keeping
women out of shelters under this exemption of bona fide reli-
gious organizations. Presumably, the language "persons of the
same religion or denomination" does not automatically bar
women; most denominations are heterogeneous. Similarly, "pro-
moting the aims of the organization" should not suffice either as
a justification for excluding women from area shelters; the mis-
sion of a homeless shelter is to shelter homeless people, and even
the law now recognizes women as a subset of the class of people.
Furthermore, as discussed more fully in Part 111,209 an essential
historical part of the church tradition has been providing sanc-
tuary to those in need. It would be difficult today to attempt to
delimit that tradition by extending sanctuary only to men.
Advocates will rightly ponder whether a court can be per-
suaded to look behind a church's invocation of the blanket stat-
utory exemption and engage even in the minimally detailed
analysis sketched here. The first amendment exists and, after
all, is first. But even if a lawsuit were ultimately to founder on
the rocks of the religious exemption, the statutory basis for sail-
ing the challenge is clear. As already seen in the earlier review of
state mental health and welfare law handles, and as further ex-
plored in the next part, this statutory anchor provides a useful
base for negotiation and consciousness-raising via media and
public attention. Few modern churches, with their denomina-
tional and community involvement roots running wide and deep,
would welcome a public defense of an exclusionary policy bar-
ring homeless women from shelters. Again, more than the merits
of judicial action should be weighed in deciding upon the appro-
priate legal action to pursue on behalf of a community's home-
less. Principles that should inform the process of selecting effec-
tive strategies are explored further in Part IV.2 10 But a change in
strategic focus, from judicial to nonjudicial approaches, is help-
ful before considering and applying those principles.
209. See text accompanying note 258, infra.
210. See text accompanying notes 267-69, infra.
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III. EXTRA-JUDICIAL, STREET STRATEGIES
A. Civil Disobedience and Media Theater
Extra-judicial, street strategies can open alternative, back
alleys leading to shelter for the homeless. Tactics based on civil
disobedience and media theater can be effective.
This is surely one of the important lessons to be learned
from a review of the tactics used by the Community for Creative
Non-Violence (CCNV), a loosely organized, communally ori-
ented collection of individuals advocating on behalf of Washing-
ton, D.C.'s homeless.2 ' In fact, CCNV's strategems read like a
textbook on a street advocacy trio the Washington Post refers to
as "civil disobedience, a flair for guerilla theater and a shrewd
sense of timing and targets. '212 A few examples will serve to
demonstrate the effectiveness of this potent combination of
street strategies.
In 1982 CCNV was trying to persuade a liberal supermarket
chain to donate unsaleable food to the homeless. To dramatize
the point that such discarded items were nevertheless edible,
and to attract the attention of influential decision makers,
CCNV served crabmeat quiche and fresh boysenberry shortcake
to a banquet assembly of 30 congressmen. These delicacies were
prepared from food salvaged from the trash dumpsters of area
supermarkets.2 "
CCNV received not just national but international media
attention by setting up "Reaganville," a city of tents raised in a
park directly across from the White House. When the Supreme
Court rejected CCNV's claim that sleeping in the park was pro-
tected first amendment expression,14 CCNV did not retreat. It
just changed tactics. It left the tents but stopped sleeping in
them, leaving the empty tents as a symbol of the administra-
tion's "empty promises" to the homeless.2 5
To focus public attention on the deteriorating, unhealthy
condition of area shelters, CCNV activists took 100 cockroaches
211. The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) is located at 1345 Euclid
St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
212. Boodman, supra note 1, at Al, col. 5, continued at A19, col. 1.
213. Id. at A20, col. 3.
214. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
215. Boodman, supra note 1, at A19, col. 1.
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caught in CCNV's communal house and released them in the
State Department Dining Room.2 16 A similar tactic was used in
response to threats by the Reagan administration to evict the
homeless from a dilapidated local shelter. CCNV, in an election
year, counter-threatened by promising a protest march on the
White House. Federal officials dropped the eviction effort; the
President himself ordered that the shelter was to remain
open.217 As discussed below, that order was short lived.218
The most dramatic and dangerous of CCNV's exploits, how-
ever, was the hunger strike of its leader, Mitch Snyder, who re-
fused to eat until the Reagan administration committed itself to
renovating a Washington, D.C. shelter. Forty-nine days into his
fast and sixty pounds lighter, Mr. Snyder began to see move-
ment in the political process. The chairman of the federal Task
Force on Food and Shelter219 visited the shelter and urged a
bedridden Mitch Snyder to eat. He refused. The Speaker of the
House, as well as the chairman of a House committee that had
held hearings on homelessness the previous winter, 2 0 asked the
administration for a speedy allocation of renovation funds. The
Speaker also telegrammed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), requesting her personal intervention. The Vice
President's wife interceded. And, literally on his deathbed, Mr.
Snyder received the federal commitment to repair the shelter
that he had demanded. The President directed HHS to take the
necesary measures to transform the shelter into a "model
facility."2' 21
The transformation has yet to occur. Subsequent, post-elec-
tion developments have led to a stalemate. HHS developed
plans for renovating the CCNV operated shelter, Mr. Snyder
criticized them as falling short of the "model facility" pledge,
and HHS withdrew from its renovation commitment. It decided
instead to provide $2.7 million to assist local governments and
other shelter providers in setting up alternative shelters, and or-
216. Id. at A19, col. 1.
217. Id.
218. See text accompanying note 222, infra.
219. Victory, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1984, at A20, col. 1 (editorial) [hereinafter cited as
Mitch Snyder's Victory].
220. Id.
221. Id.
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dered that the CCNV shelter be closed. 22 Residents of the
CCNV shelter then sued the President and HHS's Secretary in
an attempt to enforce the government's commitment to renovate
the shelter.2 2s The district court upheld HHS's decision to close
the shelter, reasoning that it was not arbitrary and capricious for
the government to choose relocation rather than renovation.2 4
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that
the decision to close rather than renovate the shelter was not
arbitrary or capricious.2 5 However, it affirmed the district
court's order only to the extent that it required the agency to
locate substitute shelter facilities for the shelter residents.2 6
Any requirement beyond that, to develop "plans to eliminate
homelessness in the Nation's Capital," was reversed as beyond
the present dispute before the court.227
While judicial relief is pursued, Mr. Snyder's special form of
brinkmanship continues. Warning that some shelter residents
will physically resist eviction, Mr. Snyder explains that "[w]e're
not going to just give up the building. '228 According to the
Washington Post, "[tihe Second Street [CCNV] shelter has been
fortified since late August [1985] against a federal takeover," be-
cause "CCNV intends to face down its adversary," although Mr.
Snyder "keeps details of his plan to himself."'229
The parrying goes on. So long as it does, CCNV keeps win-
ning even while losing; public attention remains focused on a
problem that shows no signs of disappearing.
The hunger strike is only one example of personal risk-tak-
ing by Mitch Snyder and other CCNV activists. On a wintry
night in February, 1980, Mr. Snyder and other colleagues en-
tered two major Washington churches in an effort to open them
to the homeless. Asked to leave, they refused and were arrested,
222. Brisbane, Homeless Caught in Conflict; Some Balk at Move to D.C. Shelter,
Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1985, at A10, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Brisbane].
223. Robbins v. Reagan, 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C. 1985).
224. Id. at 1276-79.
225. Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
226. Id. at 51.
227. Id.
228. Brisbane, supra note 222.
229. Id. See also Residents are Said to Fortify Capital Shelter for the Homeless,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1985, at A25, col. 3.
1986]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
charged and convicted of unlawful entry.230 Their "necessity"
defense 23 was rejected by the courts in part because their ac-
tions in opening and entering the churches' doors were taken to
focus public attention on the homelessness issue and not, as le-
gal doctrine requires, as a last resort to avoid immediate harm to
homeless individuals.32 Although their legal defense failed, their
exercise in raising public awareness via civil disobedience
succeeded.
B. Community Organizing
Community organizing centered on legislative and adminis-
trative advocacy is both a useful and necessary counterpart to
guerilla theater and civil disobedience techniques that focus
public attention on the plight of the homeless.
CCNV's success has not been limited to elevating public
consciousness of the existence and needs of the homeless. It has
also demonstrated the effectiveness-indeed, the necessity-of
translating media attention into political change. Two examples
will suffice. CCNV recently spearheaded a community organizing
effort that placed 32,000 signatures on a Washington, D.C. ballot
initiative that would guarantee a night of free shelter for the
District's homeless.2 3 On November 6, 1984, the shelter referen-
dum was approved by Washington, D.C. voters.23 '
In initially winning the war, CCNV also won an important
skirmish along the way. Early in its voter registration drive, it
230. Griffin v. United States, 447 A.2d 776, 777 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
907.
231. "In essence, the necessity defense exonerates persons who commit a crime under
the 'pressure of circumstances,' if the harm that would have resulted from compliance
with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the de-
fendants' breach of the law." Griffin, 447 A.2d at 777.
232. Id. at 778.
233. Boodman, supra note 1, at A19, col. 1.
234. See What To Do About the Shelter Vote, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1984 at A26, col.
1 (editorial). The Washington D.C. shelter referendum was struck down in District of
Columbia v. Board of Elections and Ethics, Civ. No. 12280-84, (D.C. Super. Ct., filed Oct.
11, 1984) on grounds that it violated a local enabling statute authorizing intiatives and
referenda except those appropriating funds. On appeal, see Board of Elections & Ethics
v. District of Columbia, No. 85-1029 & 85-1043 (D.C. Ct. App. May 20, 1986) (reported in
509 A.2d withdrawn (1986)). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 et seq. (1985).
In New York City, a homeless referendum was not allowed on the ballot because the
funding mechanism put forward required state legislative approval. Adams v. Cuevas,
No. 16838/86, 506 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1986).
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urged several homeless men to register to vote. The city registrar
rejected their application on grounds that steam grates do not
qualify as residences under the local voting ordinance. 35 CCNV
appealed and won. 3 6
CCNV's experience in securing legislation favorable to the
homeless is not unique. Declaring that "[tihe people of New
York State will be measured by the degree of compassion we ex-
hibit on the least fortunate, 2 3 7 Governor Mario M. Cuomo in
March, 1983, proposed a bill, passed by the New York legisla-
ture the following month, appropriating $12.5 million in the first
of a four year, $50 million effort to assist New York's home-
less.2 38 The statute provides state funding to municipalities and
non-profit organizations to renovate or construct housing for the
homeless.23 9
A related attempt to seek legislative relief for the homeless,
on a small scale, comes from a small Pennsylvania community
coalition for the homeless. The Pennsylvania legislature recently
passed a resolution decrying the lot of the homeless and, follow-
ing the traditional legislative pattern, established a committee to
study the problem and propose legislative solutions.2 40 The spe-
cial committee formed by the resolution, in turn, contacted local
county commissioners and other heads of municipal government,
requesting their input. The local coalition for the homeless, of
which I am a member, submitted a response241 answering the
committee's "who, what and where" questions and accepting its
invitation to recommend how "state government [can] assist in
addressing the problem of homelessness. ' '242
235. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1984 at B6, col. 4.
236. Id. A California case has similarly upheld the right of homeless persons to regis-
ter to vote, listing a city park as their domicile. Collier v. Menzel, 176 Cal. App.3d 24
(1985).
237. Press Release, March 7, 1983, introducing the Homeless Assistance and Shelter
Establishment Program, enacted by the New York legislature as N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§
41-44 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986), and signed by Gov. Cuomo on Apr. 19, 1983.
238. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §41 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986).
239. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 43 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986).
240. H.R. 249 (June 26, 1984).
241. Recommendations of the Franklin County Coalition for the Homeless (Oct. 1,
1984) (recommending legislative remedies to homelessness, to the Special Committee on
H.R. 249 of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives).
242. Letter from the Pennsylvania House of Representatives' Special Committee on
H.R. 249 to county commissioners (Aug. 30, 1984).
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The coalition's response goes beyond proposals for adequate
statewide funding for homeless shelters. It also recommends leg-
islation aimed at several of the contributing causes of homeless-
ness. It seeks appropriations for community placements for
mentally ill individuals coupled with state legislation supersed-
ing local zoning ordinances which operate to exclude group
homes for the mentally ill from residential areas; continuation of
the state imposed moratorium on Social Security Disability ter-
minations; repeal of state legislation cutting off public assistance
to needy single individuals after 90 days of benefits; legislation
mandating that employers of migrant farmworkers provide ade-
quate housing to both workers and their families; a statutory
prohibition of self-help evictions; and legislation, patterned after
Washington, D.C.'s shelter referendum, recognizing on a state-
wide basis a right to overnight shelter for the homeless.243
The Pennsylvania legislature on December 11, 1985 adopted
a much more limited yet important response to statewide re-
quests to address both the long and short term needs of Penn-
sylvania's homeless. 244 Governor Thornburgh signed legislation
providing $5.5 million for transitional (bridge) and single room
occupancy (SRO) housing facilities for homeless or potentially
homeless individuals and families.4 5
These recommendations from a homeless advocacy group
located in a small, rural Pennsylvania community, together with
similar submissions from around the state, illustrate one of two
points worth remembering about community based efforts on
behalf of the homeless. The first is that the homelessness issue
can provide a focal point for organizing efforts directed to
broader yet related economic rights concerns. The second is the
importance of establishing church involvement as an integral
part of any coalition, community based strategy.
C. Church Involvement
The significant judicial, moral and political value of church
involvement in community based efforts to shelter the homeless
243. Recommendations of the Franklin County Coalition for the Homeless (Oct. 1,
1984), at 6-9.
244. H.B. 1353 (Dec. 11, 1985); Public Opinion (Chambersburg, Pa.), Dec. 13, 1985 at
15; Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 15, 1985 at 6-H.
245. Id.
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should not be overlooked. The judicial advantages of church in-
volvement in the struggle for shelter for the homeless is exempli-
fied by St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken.2"
There, the church operated a shelter for the homeless in the
church's basement, providing meals and lodging for between 30
and 50 individuals per night.247 The church is located within the
city of Hoboken and is therefore subject to its zoning laws. The
municipality attempted to shut down the shelter by enforcing its
zoning ordinance, which permitted as accessory uses only such
"other uses customarily incident to principal uses and on the
same lot. '248 The church argued that sheltering the homeless
qualified as an accessory use to a church.
In granting a preliminary injunction preventing the munici-
pality from enforcing its zoning ordinance so as to close the shel-
ter, the Superior Court of New Jersey skipped over the issue of
how the local ordinance was to be construed and moved on to
higher ground.250 It raised the "important issue as to the
breadth of religious freedom when confronted with the zoning
authority of local government. '251 The court decided the church-
state issue in the church's favor. The zoning power, the court
insisted, cannot be used to preclude a church from exercising its
religious function in providing sanctuary for the homeless .22
Such use of the zoning power contravenes the first amendment's
free exercise clause. 253
Hoboken vividly illustrates the significant buffer role a
246. 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983).
247. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. at 417, 479 A.2d at 937.
248. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. at 417, 479 A.2d at 937, (quoting Hoboken, N.J., Zon-
ing Ordinance S. 4.5203). For another more recent success in resisting the use of munici-
pal zoning powers to exclude shelters for the homeless, see, S.C.O.P.E., Inc. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, No. L-053018-84 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1985), reported in 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 892 (Dec. 1985), where a New Jersey court reversed a local zoning
board's denial of a use variance to an agency to operate an emergency shelter. The court
found that the proposed shelter would serve the important public policy of caring for the
homeless; consequently, it must be considered an "inherently beneficial use" under state
zoning law precedent. See also, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cent., 105 S. Ct.
3249 (1985) (city's requirement of a special use permit for a proposed group home for the
mentally retarded violates equal protection).
249. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. at 417, 479 A.2d at 937.
250. Id. at 417-18, 479 A.2d at 937.
251. Id. at 417, 479 A.2d at 937.
252. Id. at 420, 479 A.2d at 938.
253. Id.
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church can play. Sheltering the homeless, at least when done
publicly, is often not the most popular exercise in social justice
that can be undertaken in many communities. Perhaps nothing
illustrates this better than the Army's efforts, such as they were,
to spend an $8 million Congressional appropriation by making
surplus military space available to local municipalities and non-
profit organizations for use as emergency shelters. Ultimately,
only about $1 million was allocated for its intended use for shel-
ters. The rest went to ordinary maintenance needs of the mili-
tary. The Army's explanation, not wholly untenable, was that
many municipalities rejected the federal offer because they sim-
ply did not want a shelter in their communities. As a councilman
and vice mayor of a middle class California suburb explained,
"We were concerned about becoming a magnet for homeless peo-
ple from the entire area. '"2 4
As such sentiments gain strength within a community, and
as the homeless become more and more visible to the public, the
result can be municipal action like that taken in Hoboken. The
insulating qualities of the first amendment saved the church's
shelter there. The fact that the shelter was run out of a church's
basement may also have been a factor in the court's lenient ap-
proach to application of local health and safety requirements.
While the court noted that the shelter "must comply with ap-
propriate health and safety laws and regulations, including rea-
sonable occupancy requirements,"25 5 it also cautioned the city
that "the church should not have to meet health and safety re-
quirements imposed upon a commercial establishment such as a
hotel,'"2 5  and that "the laws and regulations should be inter-
preted in a reasonable and common sense manner bearing in
mind that overly strict enforcement might force the shelter to
close. 2 57
Hoboken also illuminates the persuasive moral influence
254. Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1984, at A23, col. 3. As additional reasons for rejecting the
military's shelter overture, other city officials and nonprofit organizations cited the fail-
ure of the federal government to extend additional financial assistance to help pay shel-
ter utility and other operating costs, the fact that military facilities are often located in
remote, isolated areas outside the reach of available transportation, and poor communi-
cation and inadequate outreach by the Army in promoting its shelter program. Id.
255. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. at 421, 479 A.2d at 939.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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that accompanies church participation in the quest to alleviate
homelessness. The case well demonstrates that providing shelter
to those in need is not new to the church's mission. Plaintiffs
submitted an affidavit from the church's reverend. It makes for
more than historical reading:
The concept of sanctuary has been a strong element of
religious tradition from Moses to the New Testament.
Sheltering the homeless and caring for the poor has con-
sistently been a church function, carried out for centuries
by religious persons. It is among the basic mandates in
the Judeo-Christian heritage . . . . Sanctuary became
such a strong religious tradition it was recognized in Ro-
man, medieval, and English common law. During the
middle ages every church was a potential sanctuary ....
After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, churches...
became stations along the Underground Railroad provid-
ing food and shelter for escaping slaves. More recently
churches and synagogues throughout this country have
opened their doors to the homeless and oppressed.2 58
Community advocates have not hesitated to open their
doors to the church, recognizing that doing so opens many more
doors. A dramatic example comes from Norristown, Pennsylva-
nia, where Nobel Peace Prize recipient Mother Teresa was in-
vited to attend the dedication of a local shelter. She came. So
did Cardinal John Krol. Local government officials, who had just
passed "the most up-to-date zoning ordinance" in the county to
contain the spread of such shelters, reacted predictably to the
shelters:
We really don't know what services they will provide.
We're fearing, I guess you would say, that this is another
attempt to set up a shelter for the homeless and
disadvantaged.2 59
The reaction of the town fathers to the religious leaders' arrival
was more subdued, however: "Hearing that heavy-weights like
Mother Teresa and Cardinal Krol are coming in, we're wonder-
258. Id.
259. Franklin County Opinion, Oct. 24, 1984, at p.1.
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ing what might happen."2 0 The local parish pastor, of course,
put it more positively, remarking that their arrival "isn't a con-
troversy, it is a blessing."2 6 1
Arranging for Mother Teresa's attendance and blessing is
obviously neither easy nor realistically possible. But neither is it
necessary. The point is first to recognize the powerful contribu-
tion the established church"2 can offer in building grass roots
community support for the homeless, and second to realize that
the Hoboken and Mother Teresa examples are not isolated inci-
dents of religious concern for the poor. Witness the pastoral let-
ter of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, which has
been aptly characterized as the beginning of "a public campaign
to make a moral issue. . .out of the condition of the poor in this
country and abroad. ' '"2
The bishops are surely right in making the plight of the
poor a moral issue. Advocates should not miss this moral dimen-
sion of homelessness, for it offers a powerful handle. As counsel
for the National Coalition for the Homeless testified before the
House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development
in 1982:
The homeless living and dying on the streets of our cities
are a standing challenge to the moral legitimacy of this
nation. Right now the homeless are the shame of
America.264
Such moral outcries can lead to, and lay the groundwork for,
additional legislative responses. On signing state legislation to
fund renovation and construction of housing for the homeless,2 6
Governor Cuomo echoed the moral message he first sounded in
his state-of-the-state speech, in which he referred to society's
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Of course, "the established church" is in many respects as fictitious as "the
homeless" if either is conceived as an homogeneous entity. Deep ideological, "left-mid-
dle-right" divisions mark "the church community" just as they do any calling. Such
splits highlight the need for advocates to be sensitive to and educated on the level of
active commitment to social justice concerns demonstrated by local community churches.
263. Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
264. Homeless in America: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Development, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1982).
265. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 41-44 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986).
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treatment of the homeless as "a test of our commitment to the
ideals of justice, fairness, and human dignity."2 6
Besides providing useful judicial and moral support, church
involvement in local community coalitions on behalf of the
homeless offers distinct political advantages. The church is often
and understandably a highly respected, credible institution in
most localities. Enlisting the participation of its representatives
in coalition advocacy efforts to shelter the homeless-from send-
ing or signing correspondence to elected representatives, to
meeting with local government officials, to educating the com-
munity on the needs of the homeless, to generating financial and
volunteer personnel support for the operation of a shelter, to
pressing for long term housing solutions for low-income people
generally-adds an impeccable presence and a persuasive voice
to the homeless and those speaking on their behalf. And it is an
institutional voice that is often listened to by decision makers.
IV. THE LESSONS OF LEGAL ACTIVISM
A. Legal Activism Principles
Principles of legal activism provide a useful yardstick of ef-
fectiveness and should be used in deciding upon the appropriate
action to pursue in attempting to shelter the homeless. Indeed,
legal activism precepts form a useful lens through which to ex-
amine the relative merits of contemplated action on behalf of
the homeless.
In his course entitled "Legal Activism" at George Washing-
ton University's National Law Center, Professor John Banzhaf
outlines several key principles of legal activism. Roughly
stated,27 they include the following basic public interest law ad-
vocacy concepts:
1. Legal leverage: choosing the course of action holding
the maximum potential to move a powerful opponent toward the
desired goal. Leverage involves two components: (a) input, or
the amount of time, effort and resources, as well as the distribu-
266. Governor's Approval Memorandum: Homeless Housing Assistance Program,
1983 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 46.
267. The description in the text of these principles of legal activism reflects my un-
derstanding gleaned from seminar discussions and should not be interpreted as a direct
statement of Professor Banzhaf's views.
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tion and magnitude of the various burdens of proof or persua-
sion that will be necessary in taking the action, versus (b) out-
put, or the resulting impact or effect of the action taken
(whether the action results in individual or group advantage, or
widespread benefit to a significant segment of the public). Gen-
erally speaking, the lower the input and the higher the output,
the greater the legal leverage.
2. Chance of success: selecting that action having at least a
reasonable likelihood of succeeding.
3. Indirection:26 8 recognizing that round-about, indirect,
creative and out-of-the-ordinary actions may be more effective
in securing desired results than frontal, direct approaches.
4. Legal judo: transforming apparent disadvantages in
your own position or contemplated action into real disadvan-
tages for the more powerful opposition. An example would be
the use of the delay aspect of litigation to augment negotiating
strength with an opponent facing time and financial pressure
(e.g., one who is losing more and more investment or develop-
ment opportunities as time passes).
5. Guerilla law: staging multiple assaults from different di-
rections on the targeted problem. Example: combining a petition
for rulemaking before the appropriate administrative agency
with an administrative complaint, a legislative hearing, and/or
litigation.
6. Ancillary advantages of legal action: realizing that the
extent to which such benefits as discovery and publicity, for ex-
ample, attend various legal actions, while not alone determina-
tive, should nevertheless be considered in a strategy selection
process.
7. Appeal: anticipating the level or intensity of interest on
the part of the media, the public and the appropriate decision
makers that can be expected to be generated both by the issue
addressed and the legal action method(s) selected.
To these selected2 9 principles of legal activism might be
268. This is my label for the concept outlined in the text.
269. Other legal activism considerations governing strategy selection include the ex-
tent to which specialized expertise will be needed to implement the desired action and
the availability of such expert assistance; the quality and accessibility of particular data
that will be necessary to support the position advanced; and the availability of other
organizations or individuals with experience and knowledge in the area who might be
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added the traditional advocacy caveat of "know thy turf"-that
is, be as knowledgeable as possible of the forum (e.g., legislative,
court, agency, political constituency, neighborhood, town coun-
cil, etc.) chosen to implement the chosen strategy.
These legal activist guides are far more easily stated than
applied; nevertheless, when applied to the range of strategies
available in the quest for shelter for the homeless they serve as
filters, separating the effective from the ineffective strategems,
and thereby help concentrate limited time, resources and energy
on the "doable" rather than the conceivable.
B. Judicial Approaches
Judicial approaches to homelessness do not score well on
the legal activism test, although the less direct litigative strate-
gies fare better than the frontal, right to shelter, test case
method.
Scrutinized under the lens of legal activism, litigation seek-
ing to establish a broad based right to shelter premised on the
total deprivation analysis developed in Part 1270 reveals far more
minuses than pluses. Such a major test case approach is hardly
highly leveraged. Admittedly, the potential output of such litiga-
tion would be great. The benefits of judicial recognition of a
right to shelter would extend far beyond the homeless. But the
necessary input, the investment of resources at the trial and ap-
pellate stages, of such a litigative effort is both tremendous and
disproportionate, particularly when the second principle of legal
activism is considered.
The determinative factor in weighing the total deprivation
litigative strategy is, of course, the likelihood of success of such
an approach. The chances of success within the present judicial
system are not good. This is 1986, not 1968. The Rehnquist
Court now sits, not the Warren Court.2 71 The tone, the judicial
perspective on government's role in redressing economic ine-
able to provide essential resources and contacts.
270. See text accompanying notes 18-138, supra.
271. Changes in the Court that occurred during President Reagan's second term
hardly bode well for poverty law generally and the shelter interests of the homeless spe-
cifically. For an analysis of the 167 judicial appointments made by President Reagan
during his first term, see Cohodas, Reagan Seen Gaining Control of Entire Federal Ju-
diciary, 42 CONG. Q. 3075 (No. 49, Dec. 8, 1984).
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qualities, is not favorable.
That this is true requires little insight. The Burger Court
made rather clear its view that government does not have any
responsibility to alleviate inequalities not of its own creation.
For example, in Maher v. Roe27 2 the Court flatly declared that
the constitution "imposes no obligation on the States to pay the
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or in-
deed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. 2 73 In ex-
plaining this conclusion, Justice Powell said that "[t]he indi-
gency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps,
impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither cre-
ated nor in any way affected by the [state's] regulation. 2 74 Jus-
tice Stewart echoed the same point in another abortion public
funding case, Harris v. McCrae.2 75
272. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
273. Id. at 469.
274. Id. at 474.
275. In McRae, Justice Stewart tells us:
[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it
a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices. The reason was explained in Maher: although gov-
ernment may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her free-
dom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls
in the latter category.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
This restrictive approach to government's responsibilities to reduce inequalities is
not confined to the abortion controversy. Even in the area of protected First Amendment
freedoms, the present Court has not been sympathetic to arguments that the denial of
government funding curtails speech by virtually outpricing the means of expression for
some organizations. For example, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washing-
ton, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), the Court upheld the IRS denial of tax-exempt status to a
citizen lobbying organization on grounds that Congress is not compelled by the First
Amendment to subsidize the petitioner's lobbying activities with public funds. The
Court was quite clear on what it thought of the petitioner's claim that its freedom of
speech was effectively penalized by the denial of tax-exempt status:
This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR
claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right . . . . We
again reject the "notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully re-
alized unless they are subsidized by the State."
Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46, quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), a case in which the Court, in
considering for the first time the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally
retarded persons, advanced as an "established principle" the proposition that "[a]s a
general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
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Advocates may counter with arguments that past precedent
surely reflects a more positive view of affirmative government
obligations. The message of Brown v. Board of Education2 76 is,
at its core, wholly affirmative; it commands integration in public
education, compelling states to create racially mixed schools.
Similarly, the reapportionment, criminal justice, and franchise
decisions discussed earlier in Part I(B)2 7 8 all carry affirmative
overtones. All reflect judicial commands that government redress
inequalities, even those not of its making.2 79
Yet the likelihood that such counter-arguments would work
to correct the Court's current refusal even to glance sidelong at
affirmative government duties to the poor is simply not high
enough to justify launching a Don Quixote campaign for a right
to shelter on the present judiciary's turf.280
The chances of success increase significantly, however, when
judicial tactics shift from a major, front door, constitutional
siege to minor, side door statutory penetrations. Litigative theo-
276. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
277. The Burger Court itself has agreed that Brown carries affirmative overtones. In
its 1979 decisions upholding broad desegregation remedies, the Court stressed that af-
fected school districts, since Brown, have been under a continuing "affirmative duty to
disestablish the dual school system." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458
(1979). See also, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (where school systems were clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which "racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch").
278. See text accompanying notes 18-119, supra.
279. For example, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), makes clear that state legis-
latures must provide for equality in voting through reapportionment and if they do not,
courts will. Similarly, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), suggests that states may have
to act (provide transcripts or their equivalents to redress inequities arguably not caused
by the state (the indigent defendant's inability to pay for the transcript)). Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), carries a similar affirmative command in its require-
ment that states fund the cost of providing counsel to indigents charged with serious
offenses. Likewise, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), commands
states to extend absolute equality, at least to the franchise, to poor and rich alike. For a
similar reading of these cases, see Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
280. Lower federal courts may offer a more inviting forum, especially in view of the
262 judicial appointments made by former President Carter. Yet, the limits of stare de-
cisis and the risk of higher appeals within the federal system pose serious institutional
limits and certainly counsel caution. Additionally, the federal bench is changing signifi-
cantly. In his first term alone, President Reagan appointed 167 judges (130 of which were
district court judgeships), relying primarily upon the selection criteria of "judicial re-
straint." See Cohodas, supra note 271, at 3075-76.
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ries based on state statutory protections for the mentally ill and
the indigent, and state prohibitions on gender-based barriers to
housing are far more inviting, in large part because they focus on
specific statutory entitlements and do not require a reluctant ju-
diciary to venture into unmarked terrain. Also, the perception of
the claim asserted shifts to more familiar judicial grounds.
Rather than seeming to be leading a vanguard regiment in a bat-
tle for a new fundamental right, plaintiffs invoking these state
law grounds appear merely to be asking for the delivery of ser-
vices and benefits the legislature has already said they are enti-
tled to receive. Thus, the homeless plaintiffs in Klostermann
and Hodge were simply requesting judicial enforcement of legis-
latively mandated benefits (aftercare mental health care, includ-
ing individualized plans for adequate housing, and emergency
public assistance for incapacitated adults, including emergency
shelter) that the executive branch had failed to provide to the
intended beneficiaries.
Besides scoring higher on the likelihood of success criteria,
these state statutory judicial approaches also better satisfy sev-
eral other legal activism guidelines. As just suggested, they heed
the principle of indirection. They embody less direct judicial
means to essentially the same pot of gold at the end of the total
deprivation rainbow, recognition of a right to shelter for the
homeless, or at least those homeless individuals within the cov-
erage of the relevant statutory scheme. Furthermore, these side
door judicial entries are more highly leveraged. The input associ-
ated with tailoring emergency shelter claims to specific statutory
provisions is significantly less than the time and resource invest-
ments necessary to litigate a broad-based constitutional law
shelter claim. The output, while not as comprehensive as the
constitutional claim, is nevertheless substantial. All similarly sit-
uated homeless people within the statutory coverage will benefit,
either by virtue of class action relief, subsequent individual en-
forcement of established precedent, or, one would hope, admin-
istrative compliance at the local level.
Additionally, these statutory approaches offer several ancil-
lary advantages. They provide pegs on which to hang local me-
dia attention. They allow opportunities for continuing media
coverage and public awareness as discovery proceeds. Also, they
serve as vehicles to seek shelter for the homeless through the
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more prompt means of negotiation and of translating the moral
dimension, the public concern, into a concrete community re-
sponse (e.g., an emergency shelter).
C. Street Strategies
Street strategies, especially when combined with litigation
based on state statutory grounds, hold the greatest promise, de-
spite their inherent risks, of addressing the shelter needs of the
homeless through a realistic legal activism approach.
There is something to be said for cockroaches, for serving
dumpster crabmeat quiche to congressmen, for entering
churches on cold February nights and for erecting empty tents
on public fora grounds. While several of these actions are illegal,
and therefore technically beyond the legitimate scope of "legal
activism,"28 ' their demonstrated effectiveness from a legal ac-
tivist perspective is difficult to deny.
These are highly leveraged actions. Input is small. Output is
large. Publicity is not merely an ancillary benefit but a primary
objective. The chances of realizing that objective, especially in
the media saturated urban environment that constitutes
CCNV's turf (the nation's capital), are far better than reasona-
ble. Furthermore, these strategies are the very embodiment of
the indirection principle, as they are multi-pronged, creative at-
tacks upon a problem high in public-moral appeal.
Yet these street oriented, guerilla theater tactics are not
without their own inherent risks. Several of those risks are worth
considering. First, these tactics simply may not work. Mitch
Snyder's hunger strike did, at least in achieving short term
goals. The timing was right; it took place, not coincidentally, at
the close of an election year in which one of the challenger's ma-
jor themes was fairness and concern for the disadvantaged. Yet
the government's withdrawal from its "model shelter" commit-
ment, its diversion of funding to other Washington, D.C. shel-
ters, and its threatened eviction of CCNV, make claims to last-
ing success, defined as going beyond generating visibility for the
281. For example, the release of cockroaches in the State Dining Room, and the entry
onto church property proved unlawful. As such, in fairness to Professor Banzhaf, such
unlawful activities are outside the scope of "legal activism," necessarily defined as legal
action toward desired social change.
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homelessness issue, dubious.
Additionally, the same tactic by the same person in the
same city, but six years earlier, failed. In 1978, CCNV demanded
that a liberal, Washington, D.C. church commit a substantial
part of its building fund to efforts to help the poor. 82 Mr. Sny-
der began a hunger strike to press the demand. The results: "[a]
psychiatrist tried to have him committed, the church flatly re-
jected his demands and Snyder, hospitalized near death, ended
his fast.""8 " That was a learning time. The lesson was hard but
worth remembering: "you can't destroy your base as you're try-
ing to build it."2 84
Second, such street strategies carry the power to alienate
friends and foes alike. As an illustration, consider the Washing-
ton Post's editorial response to "Mitch Snyder's [hunger strike]
Victory":
Mitch Snyder is a zealot. It is characteristic of zealots
that they go too far. They push issues to a point where
they make the public and people in high places feel that
they are being pressured-as, in fact, they are.28'
It is tempting to respond that pressure in the political process is
as American as Thanksgiving. But it is also worth noting the
implicit message in the Post's editorial. Dramatic tactics with
high media and moral appeal may disserve the cause that forms
the objective of those tactics if carried to the point of alienating
both the public and the decision makers.
Third, a related risk of media saturated, guerilla theater
ploys is the danger that the drama of single acts may divert at-
tention from the play itself. A different but related example il-
luminates this risk, as well as the corollary danger that street
strategies that are inviting to advocates may be far less capti-
vating to those on the streets themselves.
There is a respectable body of constitutional law doctrine
282. Boodman, supra note 1, at A20, col. 1.
283. Id.
284. Id., quoting a former priest previously associated with CCNV in its formative
years.
285. Mitch Snyder's Victory, supra note 137, at A20, col. 1. In fairness to the Post, its
editorial was generally favorable to the cause (action on behalf of the homeless), pro-
moted by Mr. Snyder's zeal.
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built around the notion that vagrancy and loitering are vulnera-
ble to due process attack on grounds that their usual vagueness
encourages arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.286 In reaching
this conclusion in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,5 7 for ex-
ample, Justice Douglas noted that "[plersons 'wandering or
strolling' from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whit-
man and Vachel Lindsay," that such wanderings "are histori-
cally part of the amenities of life as we have known them" and
"have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling
of creativity. ' 28 8 Indeed, Justice Douglas' opinion in Papachris-
tou reads almost like an ode to homelessness, although of an ob-
viously different type.
Advocates with a keen eye to public consciousness raising
via media hype might conceivably turn the selective enforce-
ment doctrine on its head by demanding that vagrancy and loi-
tering statutes or local ordinances, common in many states '89
and municipalities,2 90 be uniformly enforced by the appropriate
police departments. 291 The intended results, of course, would be
286. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Lawson v.
Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
287. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
288. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
289. In Pennsylvania, for example, it is a misdemeanor of the third degree to loiter
maliciously or prowl around a dwelling at night. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5506 (Purdon
1983). The statute has been upheld against a due process vagueness challenge and has
been construed to apply to nocturnal prowling not just around a dwelling but in the
vicinity or neighborhood as well. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 456 Pa. 495, 31 A.2d 917
(1974). See also, Commonwealth v. Williams, 185 Pa. Super. 312, 137 A.2d 903 (1958),
and Commonwealth v. Belz, 295 Pa. Super. 183, 441 A.2d 410 (1982).
290. In the municipality in which I reside, for example, local ordinances make it un-
lawful for a minor to "loiter or remain in public streets or other public places" during
designated nighttime hours, and for any person to "linger" more than 10 minutes on a
municipal or private parking lot at certain hours "for a purpose unconnected with lawful
activity related to the use and purpose for which such parking lots were established."
CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE BOROUGH OF CHAMBERSBURG, Ch. VI, Parts 1 and 5 respec-
tively (1981).
291. Justice Douglas, of course, would probably turn somersaults in his grave if word
of such uses of his homage to the free life could reach him. The real life point, however,
is whether the homeless should be placed in the position of turning over their steam
grates for jail cells.
An incidental point, one of strategy selection, implicates the know-thy-turf princi-
ple. Demanding such an exchange in a liberal, urban environment might well prove effec-
tive in evoking the intended public outcry for more humane alternatives-from a sophis-
ticated public sensitive to civil liberties concerns. In a more conservative, Bible-belt,
rural community deeply devoted to the work ethic, however, the public response might
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warm, overnight shelter (albeit in jail) and perhaps at least one
meal, for the homeless. Better, advocates might argue, than
frostbite in February.
To the homeless individual, on the other hand, the trade-off
between the steam grate, the bus depot, a local park or the back
seat of a car for a criminal record may or may not be as clearcut
and attractive. The real issue, then, becomes less what strategy
to employ than who is to choose the strategies. The necessity of
maintaining the bond, the communicative link, between advo-
cates and clientele is nowhere more important.
Fourth and finally, guerilla theater without more remains
guerilla theater. It is in this very weakness, however, that signs
of the strength of street strategies are most apparent. When
linked with the litigative approaches outlined earlier, particu-
larly those rooted in state statutory law grounds, and when cou-
pled with community coalition efforts toward building grass
roots support for the homeless, particularly those involving
church representatives as active participants, street solutions to
a street problem make a great deal more than street sense.
CONCLUSION
Homelessness must be eliminated or at the very least allevi-
ated. Common agreement exists on that moral premise. This ar-
ticle has been addressed to the tactical means to that unassaila-
ble end.
Confronting the dragon head-on with a total deprivation li-
tigative lance thrown, with the best of white knight intentions,
to penetrate to a core right to shelter is potent stuff. The bene-
fits of such a dragon feast-the establishment of a constitutional
right to shelter and the ripple effects such judicial recognition of
the vital role of housing would have on other subsistence inter-
ests, such as food, medical care, even education-are indeed
awesome to behold. But the present judiciary's scales are very,
very tough. Such frontal attacks may be better saved for other
courts, say poverty-sensitive state courts, or other times, say
2084, rather than the belt-tightening 1980s.
Flank attacks, especially those coming from state statutory
prove to be just the reverse. Jail might be perceived as the proper alternative to those
who "fail to help themselves" (and make a public spectacle of their "failure").
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ambushes (e.g., mental health, public assistance and sex discrim-
ination law thickets), offer a far better chance of slaying the
beast by targeting more exposed points of vulnerability.
Street-based strategies, including media theater sallies, co-
ordinated with legislative and administrative advocacy and com-
munity coalition building, heavily seasoned with activist church
involvement, are an absolutely essential addition to the modern
arsenal. Cockroaches and TV cameras work better against con-
temporary dragons than lances and suits of mail.
Dragon slaying metaphors aside, it is this combination of ju-
dicial and street strategies that holds the greatest promise of
keeping the number of the Lucite 6 from growing-the best
chance of keeping the line of boxed human ashes from extending
over the edge of the white piano.

